Why Are So Many
Americans in Prison?
Race and the
transformation of criminal justice
Glenn C. Loury
8
The early 1990s were the age of drive-by shootings, drug
deals gone bad, crack cocaine, and gangsta rap. Between
1960 and 1990, the annual number of murders in New Haven
rose from six to 31, the number of rapes from four to
168, the number of robberies from 16 to 1,784—all this
while the city’s population declined by 14 percent.
Crime was concentrated in central cities: in 1990, two
fifths of Pennsylvania’s violent crimes were committed
in Philadelphia, home to one seventh of the state’s
population. The subject of crime dominated American
domestic-policy debates.
Most observers at the
time expected things to get worse. Consulting
demographic tables and extrapolating trends, scholars
and pundits warned the public to prepare for an
onslaught, and for a new kind of criminal—the anomic,
vicious, irreligious, amoral juvenile “super-predator.”
In 1996, one academic commentator predicted a
“bloodbath” of juvenile homicides in 2005.
And so we prepared.
Stoked by fear and political opportunism, but also by
the need to address a very real social problem, we threw
lots of people in jail, and when the old prisons were
filled we built new ones.
But the onslaught never
came. Crime rates peaked in 1992 and have dropped
sharply since. Even as crime rates fell, however,
imprisonment rates remained high and continued their
upward march. The result, the current American prison
system, is a leviathan unmatched in human history.
According to a 2005
report of the International Centre for Prison Studies in
London, the United States—with five percent of the
world’s population—houses 25 percent of the world’s
inmates. Our incarceration rate (714 per 100,000
residents) is almost 40 percent greater than those of
our nearest competitors (the Bahamas, Belarus, and
Russia). Other industrial democracies, even those with
significant crime problems of their own, are much less
punitive: our incarceration rate is 6.2 times that of
Canada, 7.8 times that of France, and 12.3 times that of
Japan. We have a corrections sector that employs more
Americans than the combined work forces of General
Motors, Ford, and Wal-Mart, the three largest corporate
employers in the country, and we are spending some $200
billion annually on law enforcement and corrections at
all levels of government, a fourfold increase (in
constant dollars) over the past quarter century.
Never before has a
supposedly free country denied basic liberty to so many
of its citizens. In December 2006, some 2.25 million
persons were being held in the nearly 5,000 prisons and
jails that are scattered across America’s urban and
rural landscapes. One third of inmates in state prisons
are violent criminals, convicted of homicide, rape, or
robbery. But the other two thirds consist mainly of
property and drug offenders. Inmates are
disproportionately drawn from the most disadvantaged
parts of society. On average, state inmates have fewer
than 11 years of schooling. They are also vastly
disproportionately black and brown.
How did it come to
this? One argument is that the massive increase in
incarceration reflects the success of a rational public
policy: faced with a compelling social problem, we
responded by imprisoning people and succeeded in
lowering crime rates. This argument is not entirely
misguided. Increased incarceration does appear to have
reduced crime somewhat. But by how much? Estimates of
the share of the 1990s reduction in violent crime that
can be attributed to the prison boom range from five
percent to 25 percent. Whatever the number, analysts of
all political stripes now agree that we have long ago
entered the zone of diminishing returns. The
conservative scholar John DiIulio, who coined the term
“super-predator” in the early 1990s, was by the end of
that decade declaring in The Wall Street Journal
that “Two Million Prisoners Are Enough.” But there was
no political movement for getting America out of the
mass-incarceration business. The throttle was stuck.
A more convincing
argument is that imprisonment rates have continued to
rise while crime rates have fallen because we have
become progressively more punitive: not because
crime has continued to explode (it hasn’t), not because
we made a smart policy choice, but because we have made
a collective decision to increase the rate of
punishment.
One simple measure of
punitiveness is the likelihood that a person who is
arrested will be subsequently incarcerated. Between 1980
and 2001, there was no real change in the chances of
being arrested in response to a complaint: the rate was
just under 50 percent. But the likelihood that an arrest
would result in imprisonment more than doubled, from 13
to 28 percent. And because the amount of time served and
the rate of prison admission both increased, the
incarceration rate for violent crime almost tripled,
despite the decline in the level of violence. The
incarceration rate for nonviolent and drug offenses
increased at an even faster pace: between 1980 and 1997
the number of people incarcerated for nonviolent
offenses tripled, and the number of people incarcerated
for drug offenses increased by a factor of 11. Indeed,
the criminal-justice researcher Alfred Blumstein has
argued that none of the growth in incarceration
between 1980 and 1996 can be attributed to more crime:
The growth was entirely attributable to a growth in
punitiveness, about equally to growth in prison
commitments per arrest (an indication of tougher
prosecution or judicial sentencing) and to longer
time served (an indication of longer sentences,
elimination of parole or later parole release, or
greater readiness to recommit parolees to prison for
either technical violations or new crimes).
This growth in
punitiveness was accompanied by a shift in thinking
about the basic purpose of criminal justice. In the
1970s, the sociologist David Garland argues, the
corrections system was commonly seen as a way to prepare
offenders to rejoin society. Since then, the focus has
shifted from rehabilitation to punishment and stayed
there. Felons are no longer persons to be
supported, but risks to be dealt with. And the
way to deal with the risks is to keep them locked up. As
of 2000, 33 states had abolished limited parole (up from
17 in 1980); 24 states had introduced three-strikes laws
(up from zero); and 40 states had introduced
truth-in-sentencing laws (up from three). The vast
majority of these changes occurred in the 1990s, as
crime rates fell.
This new system of
punitive ideas is aided by a new relationship between
the media, the politicians, and the public. A handful of
cases—in which a predator does an awful thing to an
innocent—get excessive media attention and engender
public outrage. This attention typically bears no
relation to the frequency of the particular type of
crime, and yet laws—such as three-strikes laws that give
mandatory life sentences to nonviolent drug
offenders—and political careers are made on the basis of
the public’s reaction to the media coverage of such
crimes.
* * *
Despite a sharp
national decline in crime, American criminal justice has
become crueler and less caring than it has been at any
other time in our modern history. Why?
The question has no
simple answer, but the racial composition of prisons is
a good place to start. The punitive turn in the nation’s
social policy—intimately connected with public rhetoric
about responsibility, dependency, social hygiene, and
the reclamation of public order—can be fully grasped
only when viewed against the backdrop of America’s often
ugly and violent racial history: there is a reason why
our inclination toward forgiveness and the extension of
a second chance to those who have violated our
behavioral strictures is so stunted, and why our
mainstream political discourses are so bereft of
self-examination and searching social criticism. This
historical resonance between the stigma of race and the
stigma of imprisonment serves to keep alive in our
public culture the subordinating social meanings that
have always been associated with blackness. Race helps
to explain why the United States is exceptional among
the democratic industrial societies in the severity and
extent of its punitive policy and in the paucity of its
social-welfare institutions.
Slavery ended a long
time ago, but the institution of chattel slavery and the
ideology of racial subordination that accompanied it
have cast a long shadow. I speak here of the history of
lynching throughout the country; the racially biased
policing and judging in the South under Jim Crow and in
the cities of the Northeast, Midwest, and West to which
blacks migrated after the First and Second World Wars;
and the history of racial apartheid that ended only as a
matter of law with the civil-rights movement. It should
come as no surprise that in the post–civil rights era,
race, far from being peripheral, has been central to the
evolution of American social policy.
The political scientist
Vesla Mae Weaver, in a recently completed dissertation,
examines policy history, public opinion, and media
processes in an attempt to understand the role of race
in this historic transformation of criminal justice. She
argues—persuasively, I think—that the punitive turn
represented a political response to the success of the
civil-rights movement. Weaver describes a process of
“frontlash” in which opponents of the civil-rights
revolution sought to regain the upper hand by shifting
to a new issue. Rather than reacting directly to
civil-rights developments, and thus continuing to fight
a battle they had lost, those opponents—consider George
Wallace’s campaigns for the presidency, which drew so
much support in states like Michigan and
Wisconsin—shifted attention to a seemingly race-neutral
concern over crime:
Once the clutch of Jim Crow had loosened, opponents
of civil rights shifted the “locus of attack” by
injecting crime onto the agenda. Through the process
of frontlash, rivals of civil rights progress
defined racial discord as criminal and argued that
crime legislation would be a panacea to racial
unrest. This strategy both imbued crime with race
and depoliticized racial struggle, a formula which
foreclosed earlier “root causes” alternatives.
Fusing anxiety about crime to anxiety over racial
change and riots, civil rights and racial
disorder—initially defined as a problem of minority
disenfranchisement—were defined as a crime problem,
which helped shift debate from social reform to
punishment.
Of course, this
argument (for which Weaver adduces considerable
circumstantial evidence) is speculative. But something
interesting seems to have been going on in the late
1960s regarding the relationship between attitudes on
race and social policy.
Before 1965, public
attitudes on the welfare state and on race, as measured
by the annually administered General Social Survey,
varied year to year independently of one another: you
could not predict much about a person’s attitudes on
welfare politics by knowing their attitudes about race.
After 1965, the attitudes moved in tandem, as welfare
came to be seen as a race issue. Indeed, the
year-to-year correlation between an index measuring
liberalism of racial attitudes and attitudes toward the
welfare state over the interval 1950–1965 was .03. These
same two series had a correlation of .68 over the period
1966–1996. The association in the American mind of race
with welfare, and of race with crime, has been achieved
at a common historical moment. Crime-control
institutions are part of a larger social-policy
complex—they relate to and interact with the labor
market, family-welfare efforts, and health and
social-work activities. Indeed, Garland argues that the
ideological approaches to welfare and crime control have
marched rightward to a common beat: “The institutional
and cultural changes that have occurred in the crime
control field are analogous to those that have occurred
in the welfare state more generally.” Just as the
welfare state came to be seen as a race issue, so, too,
crime came to be seen as a race issue, and policies have
been shaped by this perception.
Consider the tortured
racial history of the War on Drugs. Blacks were twice as
likely as whites to be arrested for a drug offense in
1975 but four times as likely by 1989. Throughout the
1990s, drug-arrest rates remained at historically
unprecedented levels. Yet according to the National
Survey on Drug Abuse, drug use among adults fell from 20
percent in 1979 to 11 percent in 2000. A similar trend
occurred among adolescents. In the age groups 12–17 and
18–25, use of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin all peaked
in the late 1970s and began a steady decline thereafter.
Thus, a decline in drug use across the board had begun a
decade before the draconian anti-drug efforts of the
1990s were initiated.
Of course, most drug
arrests are for trafficking, not possession, so usage
rates and arrest rates needn’t be expected to be
identical. Still, we do well to bear in mind that the
social problem of illicit drug use is endemic to our
whole society. Significantly, throughout the period
1979–2000, white high-school seniors reported using
drugs at a significantly higher rate than black
high-school seniors. High drug-usage rates in white,
middle-class American communities in the early 1980s
accounts for the urgency many citizens felt to mount a
national attack on the problem. But how successful has
the effort been, and at what cost?
Think of the cost this
way: to save middle-class kids from the threat of a drug
epidemic that might not have even existed by the time
that drug incarceration began its rapid increase in the
1980s, we criminalized underclass kids. Arrests went up,
but drug prices have fallen sharply over the past 20
years—suggesting that the ratcheting up of enforcement
has not made drugs harder to get on the street. The
strategy clearly wasn’t keeping drugs away from those
who sought them. Not only are prices down, but the data
show that drug-related visits to emergency rooms also
rose steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
An interesting case in
point is New York City. Analyzing arrests by residential
neighborhood and police precinct, the criminologist
Jeffrey Fagan and his colleagues Valerie West and Jan
Holland found that incarceration was highest in the
city’s poorest neighborhoods, though these were often
not the neighborhoods in which crime rates were the
highest. Moreover, they discovered a perverse effect of
incarceration on crime: higher incarceration in a given
neighborhood in one year seemed to predict higher crime
rates in that same neighborhood one year later. This
growth and persistence of incarceration over time, the
authors concluded, was due primarily to the drug
enforcement practices of police and to sentencing laws
that require imprisonment for repeat felons. Police
scrutiny was more intensive and less forgiving in
high-incarceration neighborhoods, and parolees returning
to such neighborhoods were more closely monitored. Thus,
discretionary and spatially discriminatory police
behavior led to a high and increasing rate of repeat
prison admissions in the designated neighborhoods, even
as crime rates fell.
Fagan, West, and
Holland explain the effects of spatially concentrated
urban anti-drug-law enforcement in the contemporary
American metropolis. Buyers may come from any
neighborhood and any social stratum. But the sellers—at
least the ones who can be readily found hawking their
wares on street corners and in public vestibules—come
predominantly from the poorest, most non-white parts of
the city. The police, with arrest quotas to meet, know
precisely where to find them. The researchers conclude:
Incarceration begets more incarceration, and
incarceration also begets more crime, which in turn
invites more aggressive enforcement, which then
re-supplies incarceration . . . three mechanisms . .
. contribute to and reinforce incarceration in
neighborhoods: the declining economic fortunes of
former inmates and the effects on neighborhoods
where they tend to reside, resource and relationship
strains on families of prisoners that weaken the
family’s ability to supervise children, and voter
disenfranchisement that weakens the political
economy of neighborhoods.
The effects of
imprisonment on life chances are profound. For
incarcerated black men, hourly wages are ten percent
lower after prison than before. For all incarcerated
men, the number of weeks worked per year falls by at
least a third after their release.
So consider the nearly
60 percent of black male high-school dropouts born in
the late 1960s who are imprisoned before their 40th
year. While locked up, these felons are stigmatized—they
are regarded as fit subjects for shaming. Their links to
family are disrupted; their opportunities for work are
diminished; their voting rights may be permanently
revoked. They suffer civic excommunication. Our zeal for
social discipline consigns these men to a permanent
nether caste. And yet, since these men—whatever their
shortcomings—have emotional and sexual and family needs,
including the need to be fathers and lovers and
husbands, we are creating a situation where the children
of this nether caste are likely to join a new generation
of untouchables. This cycle will continue so long as
incarceration is viewed as the primary path to social
hygiene.
* * *
I have been exploring
the issue of causes: of why we took the punitive turn
that has resulted in mass incarceration. But even if the
racial argument about causes is inconclusive, the racial
consequences are clear. To be sure, in the United
States, as in any society, public order is maintained by
the threat and use of force. We enjoy our good lives
only because we are shielded by the forces of law and
order, which keep the unruly at bay. Yet in this
society, to a degree virtually unmatched in any other,
those bearing the brunt of order enforcement belong in
vastly disproportionate numbers to historically
marginalized racial groups. Crime and punishment in
America has a color.
In his fine study
Punishment and Inequality in America (2006), the
Princeton University sociologist Bruce Western
powerfully describes the scope, nature, and consequences
of contemporary imprisonment. He finds that the extent
of racial disparity in imprisonment rates is greater
than in any other major arena of American social life:
at eight to one, the black–white ratio of incarceration
rates dwarfs the two-to-one ratio of unemployment rates,
the three-to-one ration of non-marital childbearing, the
two-to-one ratio of infant-mortality rates and
one-to-five ratio of net worth. While three out of 200
young whites were incarcerated in 2000, the rate for
young blacks was one in nine. A black male resident of
the state of California is more likely to go to a state
prison than a state college.
The scandalous truth is
that the police and penal apparatus are now the primary
contact between adult black American men and the
American state. Among black male high-school dropouts
aged 20 to 40, a third were locked up on any given day
in 2000, fewer than three percent belonged to a union,
and less than one quarter were enrolled in any kind of
social program. Coercion is the most salient meaning of
government for these young men. Western estimates that
nearly 60 percent of black male dropouts born between
1965 and 1969 were sent to prison on a felony conviction
at least once before they reached the age of 35.
One cannot reckon the
world-historic American prison build-up over the past 35
years without calculating the enormous costs imposed
upon the persons imprisoned, their families, and their
communities. (Of course, this has not stopped many
social scientists from pronouncing on the net benefits
of incarceration without doing so.) Deciding on the
weight to give to a “thug’s” well-being—or to that of
his wife or daughter or son—is a question of social
morality, not social science. Nor can social science
tell us how much additional cost borne by the offending
class is justified in order to obtain a given increment
of security or property or peace of mind for the rest of
us. These are questions about the nature of the American
state and its relationship to its people that transcend
the categories of benefits and costs.
Yet the discourse
surrounding punishment policy invariably discounts the
humanity of the thieves, drug sellers, prostitutes,
rapists, and, yes, those whom we put to death. It gives
insufficient weight to the welfare, to the humanity, of
those who are knitted together with offenders in webs of
social and psychic affiliation. What is more,
institutional arrangements for dealing with criminal
offenders in the United States have evolved to serve
expressive as well as instrumental ends. We have wanted
to “send a message,” and we have done so with a
vengeance. In the process, we have created facts. We
have answered the question, who is to blame for the
domestic maladies that beset us? We have constructed a
national narrative. We have created scapegoats, indulged
our need to feel virtuous, and assuaged our fears. We
have met the enemy, and the enemy is them.
Incarceration keeps
them away from us. Thus Garland: “The prison
is used today as a kind of reservation, a quarantine
zone in which purportedly dangerous individuals are
segregated in the name of public safety.” The boundary
between prison and community, Garland continues, is
“heavily patrolled and carefully monitored to prevent
risks leaking out from one to the other. Those offenders
who are released ‘into the community’ are subject to
much tighter control than previously, and frequently
find themselves returned to custody for failure to
comply with the conditions that continue to restrict
their freedom. For many of these parolees and
ex-convicts, the ‘community’ into which they are
released is actually a closely monitored terrain, a
supervised space, lacking much of the liberty that one
associates with ‘normal life’.”
Deciding how citizens
of varied social rank within a common polity ought to
relate to one another is a more fundamental
consideration than deciding which crime-control policy
is most efficient. The question of relationship, of
solidarity, of who belongs to the body politic and who
deserves exclusion—these are philosophical concerns of
the highest order. A decent society will on occasion
resist the efficient course of action, for the simple
reason that to follow it would be to act as though we
were not the people we have determined ourselves to be:
a people conceived in liberty and dedicated to the
proposition that we all are created equal. Assessing the
propriety of creating a racially defined pariah class in
the middle of our great cities at the start of the 21st
century presents us with just such a case.
My recitation of the
brutal facts about punishment in today’s America may
sound to some like a primal scream at this monstrous
social machine that is grinding poor black communities
to dust. And I confess that these brutal facts do at
times incline me to cry out in despair. But my argument
is analytical, not existential. Its principal thesis is
this: we law-abiding, middle-class Americans have made
decisions about social policy and incarceration, and we
benefit from those decisions, and that means from a
system of suffering, rooted in state violence, meted out
at our request. We had choices and we decided to be more
punitive. Our society—the society we have made—creates
criminogenic conditions in our sprawling urban ghettos,
and then acts out rituals of punishment against them as
some awful form of human sacrifice.
This situation raises a
moral problem that we cannot avoid. We cannot pretend
that there are more important problems in our society,
or that this circumstance is the necessary solution to
other, more pressing problems—unless we are also
prepared to say that we have turned our backs on the
ideal of equality for all citizens and abandoned the
principles of justice. We ought to ask ourselves two
questions: Just what manner of people are we
Americans? And in light of this, what are our
obligations to our fellow citizens—even those who break
our laws?
* * *
To address these
questions, we need to think about the evaluation of our
prison system as a problem in the theory of distributive
justice—not the purely procedural idea of ensuring equal
treatment before the law and thereafter letting the
chips fall where they may, but the rather more demanding
ideal of substantive racial justice. The goal is
to bring about through conventional social policy and
far-reaching institutional reforms a situation in which
the history of racial oppression is no longer so evident
in the disparate life experiences of those who descend
from slaves.
And I suggest we
approach that problem from the perspective of John
Rawls’s theory of justice: first, that we think about
justice from an “original position” behind a “veil of
ignorance” that obstructs from view our own situation,
including our class, race, gender, and talents. We need
to ask what rules we would pick if we seriously imagined
that we could turn out to be anyone in the society.
Second, following Rawls’s “difference principle,” we
should permit inequalities only if they work to improve
the circumstances of the least advantaged members of
society. But here, the object of moral inquiry is not
the distribution among individuals of wealth and income,
but instead the distribution of a negative good,
punishment, among individuals and, importantly, racial
groups.
So put yourself in John
Rawls’s original position and imagine that you
could occupy any rank in the social hierarchy. Let me be
more concrete: imagine that you could be born a
black American male outcast shuffling between prison and
the labor market on his way to an early death to the
chorus of nigger or criminal or dummy.
Suppose we had to stop thinking of us and them.
What social rules would we pick if we actually thought
that they could be us? I expect that we
would still pick some set of punishment institutions to
contain bad behavior and protect society. But wouldn’t
we pick arrangements that respected the humanity of each
individual and of those they are connected to through
bonds of social and psychic affiliation? If any one of
us had a real chance of being one of those faces looking
up from the bottom of the well—of being the least among
us¬Ť—then how would we talk publicly about those who
break our laws? What would we do with juveniles who go
awry, who roam the streets with guns and sometimes
commit acts of violence? What weight would we give to
various elements in the
deterrence-retribution-incapacitation-rehabilitation
calculus, if we thought that calculus could end up being
applied to our own children, or to us? How would we
apportion blame and affix responsibility for the
cultural and social pathologies evident in some quarters
of our society if we envisioned that we ourselves might
well have been born into the social margins where such
pathology flourishes?
If we take these
questions as seriously as we should, then we would, I
expect, reject a pure ethic of personal responsibility
as the basis for distributing punishment. Issues about
responsibility are complex, and involve a kind of
division of labor—what John Rawls called a “social
division of responsibility” between “citizens as a
collective body” and individuals: when we hold a person
responsible for his or her conduct—by establishing laws,
investing in their enforcement, and consigning some
persons to prisons—we need also to think about whether
we have done our share in ensuring that each person
faces a decent set of opportunities for a good life. We
need to ask whether we as a society have fulfilled our
collective responsibility to ensure fair conditions for
each person—for each life that might turn out to be our
life.
We would, in short,
recognize a kind of social responsibility, even for the
wrongful acts freely chosen by individual persons. I am
not arguing that people commit crimes because they have
no choices, and that in this sense the “root causes” of
crime are social; individuals always have choices. My
point is that responsibility is a matter of ethics, not
social science. Society at large is implicated in an
individual person’s choices because we have acquiesced
in—perhaps actively supported, through our taxes and
votes, words and deeds—social arrangements that work to
our benefit and his detriment, and which shape his
consciousness and sense of identity in such a way that
the choices he makes, which we may condemn, are
nevertheless compelling to him—an entirely
understandable response to circumstance. Closed and
bounded social structures—like racially homogeneous
urban ghettos—create contexts where “pathological” and
“dysfunctional” cultural forms emerge; but these forms
are neither intrinsic to the people caught in these
structures nor independent of the behavior of people who
stand outside them.
Thus, a central reality
of our time is the fact that there has opened a wide
racial gap in the acquisition of cognitive skills, the
extent of law-abidingness, the stability of family
relations, the attachment to the work force, and the
like. This disparity in human development is, as a
historical matter, rooted in political, economic,
social, and cultural factors peculiar to this society
and reflective of its unlovely racial history: it is a
societal, not communal or personal, achievement. At the
level of the individual case we must, of course, act as
if this were not so. There could be no law, no
civilization, without the imputation to particular
persons of responsibility for their wrongful acts. But
the sum of a million cases, each one rightly judged on
its merits to be individually fair, may nevertheless
constitute a great historic wrong. The state does not
only deal with individual cases. It also makes policies
in the aggregate, and the consequences of these policies
are more or less knowable. And who can honestly say—who
can look in the mirror and say with a straight face—that
we now have laws and policies that we would endorse if
we did not know our own situation and genuinely
considered the possibility that we might be the least
advantaged?
Even if the current
racial disparity in punishment in our country gave
evidence of no overt racial discrimination—and, perhaps
needless to say, I view that as a wildly optimistic
supposition—it would still be true that powerful forces
are at work to perpetuate the consequences of a
universally acknowledged wrongful past. This is in the
first instance a matter of interpretation—of the
narrative overlay that we impose upon the facts.
The tacit association
in the American public’s imagination of “blackness” with
“unworthiness” or “dangerousness” has obscured a
fundamental ethical point about responsibility, both
collective and individual, and promoted essentialist
causal misattributions: when confronted by the facts of
racially disparate achievement, racially
disproportionate crime rates, and racially unequal
school achievement, observers will have difficulty
identifying with the plight of a group of people whom
they (mistakenly) think are simply “reaping what they
have sown.” Thus, the enormous racial disparity in the
imposition of social exclusion, civic ex-communication,
and lifelong disgrace has come to seem legitimate, even
necessary: we fail to see how our failures as a
collective body are implicated in this disparity. We
shift all the responsibility onto their
shoulders, only by irresponsibly—indeed,
immorally—denying our own. And yet, this entire dynamic
has its roots in past unjust acts that were perpetrated
on the basis of race.
Given our history,
producing a racially defined nether caste through the
ostensibly neutral application of law should be
profoundly offensive to our ethical sensibilities—to the
principles we proudly assert as our own. Mass
incarceration has now become a principal vehicle for the
reproduction of racial hierarchy in our society. Our
country’s policymakers need to do something about it.
And all of us are ultimately responsible for making sure
that they do. <
Glenn C. Loury
is the Merton P. Stoltz Professor of the Social Sciences
in the department of economics at Brown University. He
is the author of The Anatomy of Racial Inequality,
and he was a 2002 Carnegie Scholar. |