Volume
28, Number 4 · March 19, 1981 Mr.
Possessed By
Aileen Kelly
Sergei
Nechaev by
Philip Pomper Rutgers University Press, 273 pp.,
$19.50 On a night in November 1869 a
student called Ivan Ivanov, a member of a small cell of revolutionaries, was
murdered by his fellow conspirators in a lonely park on the outskirts of
Moscow. The leader of the group, Sergei Nechaev, subsequently escaped abroad,
but police investigations into the crime uncovered a wide network of people
associated with him. At their trial the prosecution produced a document
written by Nechaev which caused a sensation. Known as "The Catechism of
a Revolutionary," it has secured for its author a place in history. The Catechism consists of
prescriptions on the organization of a revolutionary secret society and the
conduct of its members. It begins by outlining the structure of the
society—small cells, hierarchically organized; but the document owes its
notoriety to the second section which deals with the attitude of the
revolutionary toward himself, his comrades, contemporary society, and the
oppressed masses. According to Nechaev the ideal revolutionary is a man with
no personal interests, feelings, or attachments, no property, and no name. He
has made a total break with the laws, traditions, conventions, and values of
the society in which he lives; all his activity is directed to its total
destruction. This goal, his sole passion, dictates utter ruthlessness in his
relations with others: "For him everything that contributes to the
triumph of the revolution is moral, everything that hinders it is immoral and
criminal." Blackmail, murder, all manner of treachery and deceit were
justified in its name, not merely against the enemy, but—and here is the
novelty of Nechaev's doctrine—against the rank and file of the revolutionary
organization itself. The
central committee at its head was to regard all those beneath it as
expendable, to be manipulated, deluded, or destroyed without compunction
according to the demands of the cause. The allegiance of the lukewarm should
be secured by the use of blackmail, the enthusiasm of the faithful sustained
by skillful deception about the size and power of the organization. The
masses for whom it was fighting were to be treated no less ruthlessly: by
provoking the government into ever more savage repression the revolutionaries
must seek to intensify the people's suffering to the point where it would be
a willing instrument in their work of destruction. Point by point, Nechaev demolished
the mystique which presented the revolutionary organization as a brotherhood
of knights, sanctified by their dedication to a noble ideal. His alternative
model was taken from life: the first embodiment of Nechaev's ideal type was
Nechaev himself. He was born in 1847 in the textile
town of Ivanovo, 350 kilometers northeast of Moscow. His mother died when he
was eight; his father worked as a painter and decorator and a part-time
waiter and caterer. Literate himself, he saw to it that his son received a
basic education, but it was the energy of the adolescent Sergei, in
particular his tenacity in forging contacts with the Ivanovo intelligentsia,
which secured him the necessary education to permit him to leave home and
obtain a teacher's qualification in St. Petersburg in 1866. He then became an
auditor at the university where he came into contact with the movement of revolutionary
populism which had grown out of the radical intelligentsia's dissatisfaction
with the provisions of the Emancipation Act of 1861. A strong sense of responsibility
for the material misery of the vast mass of the population, a millenarian
belief in the moral regeneration of Russia through an agrarian socialism
based on the peasant commune, and a rationalist faith in the inevitability of
progress once outworn institutions and beliefs were destroyed—all these
factors combined in the radical (mainly student) youth of the capital to
produce a fervent and self-sacrificing dedication to action that led in 1865
to the formation of the first Russian terrorist group and an attempt on the
life of the tsar in the following year. The government responded with strong
measures against the students, and tension in the capital was at its height
when Nechaev made his first contacts with revolutionary circles. In 1869 with
a group of students he founded a political circle to help prepare the popular
revolution which they believed would break out the following year. Their
program had a strong Jacobin flavor: after seizing power in a political coup
d'état their "committee" would bring about a social revolution. His contemporaries represent
Nechaev as a primitive nature, intellectually narrow and limited, but with an
extraordinarily dominating will and a fanatical dedication to revolution,
fueled by a vengeful hatred which seemed his only emotion. Repelled by his
total lack of compassion for the people or affection for his comrades, his
fellow revolutionaries were nevertheless irresistibly drawn to him by his
commitment to action. This and his dominating personality were his only
claims to leadership; his conspiratorial techniques and methods of
recruitment were inept and his vision of the future society vague—he was seen
by some as an anarchist, by others as an authoritarian communist—but his only
real interests were the immediate future and the task of destruction. The Catechism seems to have been
composed in 1869, and from then on Nechaev devoted himself to exemplifying
its principles in his actions. To establish his personal domination over the
revolutionary movement he embarked on a systematic policy of deceit and
intimidation aimed at surrounding himself with an atmosphere of mystery and
fear. When the committee was broken up by arrests in March 1869 he had
already fled abroad, spreading a false rumor to the effect that he too had
been arrested and had performed the amazing feat of escaping from the
impregnable St. Peter and Paul Fortress. Abroad, he made contact with Bakunin
and Nikolai Ogarev, who had been co-editor with Herzen of the great émigré
journal The Bell, seducing both elderly revolutionaries by his energy
and convincing them of his importance as the representative of a powerful
network of revolutionary organizations in Russia. On returning to Moscow in
September 1869 he posed with Bakunin's connivance as an emissary of a
nonexistent "World Revolutionary Alliance" and on the strength of
the authority which this bestowed on him founded a revolutionary secret
society based, in accordance with the Catechism, on cells of five members
each. The core of the society seems to have been no more than forty students,
though according to one member there were as many as four hundred involved in
some way with it. Nechaev demanded unquestioning obedience from his followers
in the name of the committee which he purported to represent. When one member
of his cell, the student Ivanov, became suspicious of his credentials, Nechaev,
on the pretext that Ivanov intended to betray them, induced the three other
members to collaborate with him in the student's murder. There was no
evidence to support his accusation: the aim of the murder was apparently to
bind the others to him by complicity in crime. The discovery of Ivanov's body by
the police led to the destruction of Nechaev's secret society and a sweeping
round-up of all those who had had any association with him. Nechaev escaped
to Switzerland where he continued his policy of mystification, publicly
denying the "shameless accusations" of murder made against him, and
circulating in Russia a report that he had been captured and died on his way
to hard labor. Meanwhile he continued to present himself abroad as the agent
of an enormous revolutionary force. But the truth about Ivanov's murder began
to circulate in émigré circles and Nechaev became isolated. He broke with
Bakunin and in a characteristic farewell gesture stole some letters from him,
with the intention of using them to blackmail his former colleague. In 1872
he was arrested by the Swiss police and deported to Russia as a common
criminal. Imprisonment for life in the
notorious Peter and Paul Fortress in no way diminished his sense of purpose
or his power over others. He converted his guards to the revolutionary cause
and through them made contact with the terrorist group The People's Will, which
planned to liberate him after assassinating the tsar in 1881. But the group
was destroyed after the killing: Nechaev's contacts with the guards were
uncovered and he was punished by a regime of extreme severity. He died,
apparently of scurvy, in 1882. Remarkable though this career was,
had Nechaev not written the Catechism it is unlikely that he would have
earned more than a footnote in Russian history as one of those fringe
personalities, half-lunatic, half-criminal, who are to be found in all violent
movements. It was the extraordinary unity of ideology and action which gives
this "bewildering combination of fanatic, swashbuckler and cad" (as
E.H. Carr described him) a claim to historical significance. Before him the
principle that the end always justifies the means was not unknown in
revolutionary practice, but he was the first practitioner to set it up
unashamedly as the cornerstone of revolutionary theory. The advent of
"Nechaevism," as this doctrine has come to be called, has been recognized
as a milestone in the history of radical ideas. Its antecedents and its moral
and political significance have fascinated a succession of writers and
historians. Dostoevsky in The Possessed was the first to explore the
metaphysical significance of Nechaev's thesis. In L'homme révolté
Camus followed him in seeing the doctrine of "la violence faite aux
frères" as the logic of revolution pushed to its extreme; while in
Berdyaev's picturesque expression, Nechaev's ascetic denial of the world made
him the "Isaac the Syrian and Ignatius Loyola of revolutionary
socialism." With the advent of the cold war,
interest in Nechaev in the West became more lively and more narrowly
practical: historical hindsight proclaimed him a precious source for the
understanding of the psychology and policies of Russia's post-revolutionary
rulers. Studies such as Robert Payne's The Terrorists: The Forerunners of
Stalin (1957) or Michael Prawdin's The Unmentionable Nechaev: A Key to
Bolshevism (1961) tried to trace a direct line of succession in political
methods and tactics from Stalin through Lenin back to Nechaev. More recently,
with the emergence of movements which make no attempt to conceal their
affinity with the principles of Nechaev's Catechism, the term Nechaevism has
acquired a new vogue, and psychohistory a new authority as a key to the
understanding of the present. Mr. Pomper's new study of Nechaev has, as he
asserts in his introduction, no pretensions to clinical detachment: his
crusading purpose is to show that Nechaevism is an extreme instance of the
"politics of revenge"—a phenomenon confined neither to Russia nor
to the political left. By examining the psychology both of Nechaev himself
and of the "revolutionary subculture" which he manipulated, Mr.
Pomper seeks to expose the mechanisms whereby individual pathologies of
conscience are transformed into doctrines of salvation which provide a
sanction for dictatorship. Mr. Pomper argues that Nechaev
owed his extraordinary influence to the strength of two impulses which his
revolutionary contemporaries possessed to a lesser degree—the pursuit of
martyrdom and of revenge—which he was able to sanctify ideologically by
translating them into political strategies. He seeks to establish the source
of these qualities in Nechaev's childhood experience in Ivanovo.
Unfortunately, the material on this is very sparse, consisting mainly of a
few letters written by the adolescent Nechaev and some rather unrevealing
memoirs by one of his two sisters. None of these provides convincing
support for Mr. Pomper's diagnosis of a "powerful martyr
identification" on Nechaev's part—a thirst for self-sacrifice as
reparation for the fact that he had risen above his family's circumstances.
Mr. Pomper hypothesizes that Nechaev must have felt a deep guilt for having
been, as a student, a drain on his family's resources. But none of his
contemporaries noticed this quality in him and his youthful letters express
no compunction about the methods he used to escape from the "devil's
swamp" of Ivanovo. Mr. Pomper seems to need this
hypothesis to explain the determination with which Nechaev later worked to
acquire the mystique of a martyr, spreading various rumors of his torture and
of his death in Siberia or at the hands of gendarmes. But there is no
evidence in Nechaev's actions of any excessive eagerness for self-immolation.
He was the only one of the killers of Ivanov to escape abroad, where he
evaded the pursuit of Russian government agents for three years. He was
handed over to them by the canton of Zurich only after the failure of his
strenuous efforts to avoid extradition by attempting to prove that Ivanov's
killing was a political murder. Though there are no doubts about his courage,
there is no reason to believe that his martyr mystique was more than one of
the myths with which he manipulated the idealism of his peers. Those, such as
the young revolutionary Vera Zasulich, who were never wholly deceived by him,
subsequently recall as his dominant characteristics only the lust for revenge
and the thirst for power. These qualities Mr. Pomper
attributes to an unconscious reaction to a father who alternated between
kindness and brutality. He postulates that Nechaev was able to forgive his
father for his victimization by placing the blame on the society which
exploited his family, coping with the combined threat of father and
environment, and justifying his own aggressive tendencies, by imitating
aspects of what he dreaded—the stratagem of "identification with the
aggressor." This structure stands on a hypothesis (the brutality of
Nechaev senior) which is built entirely on two assertions in the memoirs of a
devoted daughter: that her father sometimes beat Sergei, and that he put
pressure on her to marry a man of his choice (an action of which Sergei
disapproved). But both these measures were quite normal on the part of a
Russian father. Only his sympathy for his son seems remarkable: he encouraged
ambitions which he could not have been expected to understand, and supplied
the funds which allowed the young Nechaev to study in St. Petersburg. Psychoanalysis at a historical
remove seems unlikely to be able to explain the intensity of Nechaev's thirst
for revenge. One can speculate usefully only on the social reasons for the
appearance of a person whose qualities seemed so much at odds with the
traditional ethos of Russian populism. The young revolutionaries of the 1860s
still came predominantly from the ranks of the relatively privileged, and
compassion for the lower depths of society played a large part in their
motivation. Nechaev was the first prominent radical to have personal
experience of those lower depths. Ivanovo was one of the early centers of
capitalism in Russia, and in Nechaev's youth its textile industry was in a
period of depression. His family was spared the dire poverty of the factory
workers, but was as far removed as they from the social elite whom Nechaev
described with bitter resentment in his adolescent correspondence. His desire
for revenge would not have appeared so unusual had he belonged to the Russian
terrorist movement of the decade after 1905, which had a much broader social
base; memoirs of that period suggest that Nechaevism was threatening to
become a mass phenomenon. Mr. Pomper is on surer
psychological ground when he passes from the makeup of Nechaev himself to the
problem of the appeal of his theories to men who were not Nechaevs. He argues
that Nechaev owed his brief ascendancy over a section of the Russian
revolutionary movement to his ability to manipulate the sensitive consciences
of the privileged young through the use of the symbols and rhetoric of
revolutionary idealism. On the one hand, the extreme asceticism of the
Revolutionary Catechism appealed to their urge for self-sacrifice as
reparation for the sufferings of the people, an urge which, as the memoirs of
that period show, had a peculiarly religious intensity. On the other hand, by
the savagery with which he wrote and spoke of real or imagined atrocities
committed by the tsar and his officials he encouraged his followers' latent
feelings of aggression, and their adolescent urge to rebel, sanctifying these
as a righteous desire to avenge the sufferings of the people. This analysis of the small group
around Nechaev is supported by contemporary accounts and carries conviction.
But Mr. Pomper uses it as a basis for sweeping conclusions about the
psychology of political extremism in general. That later Russian
revolutionaries, while repudiating Nechaev's doctrine that the end justifies
the use of any means whatever, continued to use techniques of centralized
conspiracy and terrorism favored by him is for Mr. Pomper sufficient reason
to discount any purity of motivation on their part as well. He argues that
Nechaev was not just a "random pathology" in an otherwise healthy
movement: the fact that his psychopathology could go undetected, that his
paranoid power-seeking was indistinguishable from heroic commitment to the
cause, shows that even in the most progressive of revolutionary movements
there are no built in safeguards against manipulation or even control by
those with a paranoid thirst for revenge; such perversions are inherent in
the function of revolutionary ideologies as a cover and a justification for
individual mechanisms of defense against guilt, suffering, or wounded pride.
The career of Nechaev, he believes, should alert us to the fact that the
"logic of commitment" to ideologies of collective salvation
prepares the way for Nechaev's means and for Nechaev's goals. The
Revolutionary Catechism is to modern extremism what the Communist Manifesto
is to communism. Mr. Pomper formulates his moral
less crudely than his cold war predecessors, but the moral is essentially the
same. There is something comforting, with more than a touch of
self-righteousness, about the attitude of Western liberal historians to the
phenomenon of Nechaevism. True, they emphasize that the enemy is closer and
more sinister than we might perhaps have supposed, but he is still outside
the walls. Those who are vulnerable to the infection of Nechaevism are those
with sick consciences, with the "ambivalences of adolescence,"
those who follow the "logic of commitment." An
"all-too-familiar phenomenon in radical movements," as Mr. Pomper
observes, Nechaevism has also become a convenient stick with which embattled
defenders of the Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition can beat those who challenge
the moral respectability and courage of compromise and the middle way. This version of the lesson of
Nechaev claims a pedigree reaching back to Dostoevsky who, as Mr. Pomper
reminds us, told the "inner story" of Nechaevism best, not only in The
Possessed, but in the entire body of his work. But the pedigree is false.
Like many Western critics, Mr. Pomper fails to distinguish between
Dostoevsky's hatred and contempt for the real Nechaev and his followers
(caricatured in the mean and twisted terrorists of The Possessed) and
his deep ambivalence toward the moral significance of Nechaevism. His novels
and his life express the dilemmas of a society where the question of how far
one should go in resisting violence and oppression by force was a problem not
of abstract principle but of daily moral choice. For nineteenth-century
Russian society the enemy was very much within the walls. If Mr. Pomper had extended his
analysis beyond the "revolutionary subculture" to the culture which
bred it and attempted to interpret it in literature, his version of the
psychology of Nechaevism might have been less shallow and less complacent.
But he has no time for sources which do not confirm his own analysis. In a
brief reference to Ivan Turgenev he comments on the extreme oddness of the
fact that this liberal writer, who showed himself so aware in his novels of
the role of personal inadequacy in the formation of radical ideologies,
nevertheless seemed to believe that some at least of the radicals of his time
acted out of higher motives—surely, he suggests, a "willful
misunderstanding" on Turgenev's part. Mr. Pomper's dismissal of
Turgenev's view as "amateur sociology," like his presumption that
Dostoevsky's analysis coincides with his own, does him no credit as a
historian. Any future study of the psychology of Russian extremism, if it is
not to be yet another attempt to bend history to political purposes, will
have to take serious account of the contribution of Turgenev and Dostoevsky.
They devoted most of their mature work over two decades to this problem, and
did so for reasons which had little to do with pure art. They believed, as
all Russian writers did, that the artist had a duty to address himself to the
deepest concerns of his nation and his time; as politically committed
individuals—one a conservative, the other a liberal—they each saw in
"nihilism" (as applied to the movement which produced Nechaev, the
term was invented by Turgenev) a threat to their central values; and they
sought through their art to explain the nature of this threat to a morally
disoriented society. Their approach was far from
amateurish: they were personally acquainted with several of the radical
leaders of their time and prepared to write their novels by immersing
themselves in contemporary revolutionary literature and closely following the
mass political trials of the late 1860s and the 1870s. But their conclusions
on the revolutionary psychology of their time continue to be either misinterpreted
or undervalued by historians. Perhaps this is so because they were
principally expressed in art (although their diaries, notebooks, and letters
are a rich source of material), or perhaps it is so because, refracting
complex and rapidly moving events, they are not easy to summarize. But the
principal reason, I suspect, is that their version of the moral challenge
presented by Nechaevism offers none of the reassurance or the certainties
which recent studies seem designed to provide. Yet it deserves to be
recalled, at least briefly, as an alternative to the version which has become
part of our political culture. Dostoevsky's answer to the
simplifiers who continue to use The Possessed to buttress their
theories is contained in an article written some years after the publication
of the novel. Here he expresses regret that so many of his readers took him
to mean that all those who believed that the end justifies the means in
revolution were fools or scoundrels. He points to his own past as a utopian
socialist; he could never have been Nechaev, but he and the best of his
comrades could certainly have been Nechaevists if it had been represented to
them that violence and murder were the only means of relieving the
intolerable suffering of the mass of humanity. The "horror" of
Nechaevism, he concludes, is not that scoundrels commit crimes in the name of
ideals, but that in periods of upheaval such as their own, perfectly decent
and honorable men could do the same. In its original conception as a
"political" novel. The Possessed had been intended to show
that the personalities of the Russian left were as diseased as its
principles; but the "upheavals" of Dostoevsky's time (including the
formation of a new terrorist movement which repudiated the cruel extremes of
Nechaev) forced him to move to a more complex position, a recognition that,
however flawed their personalities might be, some at least of the
revolutionary types whom he sought to portray had made a moral choice which
sprang from legitimate human needs. Even while writing The Possessed
he had expressed the hope that his readers would see Stavrogin (to whom he
attributes the authorship of a "revolutionary catechism") as not
merely a criminal but also a "tragic" hero. Dostoevsky's notebooks and the
memoirs of his friend Suvorin testify to the qualms which prevented him from
wholeheartedly denouncing terrorist violence; and in his last novel, written
when this violence was at its height, he allows his most tragic
"Nechaevist" hero, Ivan Karamazov, to present the case for the
opposition. Ivan argues that the call to violence as a means to the goal of
social justice is the answer of reason to the Christian ethic of forgiveness,
which seems, on the observable evidence of history and human behavior, to be
singularly ineffective as a means of persuading men not to oppress their
neighbors. Though Dostoevsky had, as his letters reveal, chosen Christ in
spite of reason, he concedes that the arguments of reason can be rejected,
but never finally refuted. Ivan and his alter ego, the Grand Inquisitor, are
not devils but devil's advocates, challenging the mystery of the Christian
ethic in the name of the people whose suffering it does nothing to relieve.
Alesha Karamazov, the most saintly of Dostoevsky's preachers of forgiveness,
is tested by Ivan with a story of a kind of atrocity not unthinkable in
tsarist Russia: a general punishes a peasant child who has lamed one of his
hunting dogs by having them tear the child to pieces in front of his mother.
Would "moral instinct" not demand that the man be killed? Alesha is
forced to confess that it would. Like later interpreters of Nechaev
Dostoevsky had set out to isolate the symptoms of the disease he represented
and offer a cure. But he was forced to the reluctant conclusion that there
existed no single, consistent ethical system or political ideology which
could bring about all conceivable goods, satisfy all man's moral instincts,
and guarantee total protection against pathologies of conscience. Each set of
circumstances demanded its own particular response along a continuum of
choice between the two extremes of the doctrine "all is permitted,"
on the one hand, and that of nonresistance to evil on the other. Not
righteous principles, but an awareness of the inadequacy of general rules in
dealing with particular cases, of the incompatibility of some ultimate values
and the consequent impurity of all moral choice—this seems to have been
Dostoevsky's final defense against the psychic disorder represented by
Nechaev's brand of fanaticism. Many Western interpreters of
Nechaev, including Mr. Pomper (on the evidence of his book), would find this
conclusion unduly pessimistic. They would argue that the proper immune system
to oppose to the virus of Nechaevism is liberalism, the ethic of the middle
way. Unfortunately for this alternative, Turgenev explored their ground
before them and probed the weakness in its defenses. Like Dostoevsky, he set
out to expose, through a gallery of revolutionary types, the narrowness and
inhumanity of the utilitarian logic of the left, but he too found himself at
a moral loss before the most impressive of the radicals he met, and before
some of his own negative heroes. In terrorists such as Vera Zasulich, who
shot the St. Petersburg chief of police, he discerned qualities approaching
saintliness. After the publication of his Fathers
and Sons he admitted that he was "confused" by his Bazarov, the
type of the "intellectual terrorist" (to use Camus's term) who
prepared the way for Nechaev: "I don't know whether I loved or hated
him." Bazarov's attacks on the personal inadequacy and moral cowardice
of many of those who recommend gradual solutions for pressing social
injustices are supported by the unflattering portraits of liberals which abound
in Turgenev's works: on the basis of painful analysis of himself and his
milieu he revealed how liberal rhetoric was used as a screen for a paralyzing
Hamletism. His analysis of Nechaevism and its causes convinced him that no
political tendency of his time had a monopoly of what Mr. Pomper describes as
"higher" or "lower" motives, and that in some historical
situations the choice of the middle way might indicate a psychological
imbalance as acute as Nechaev's. In his public lecture of 1860, Hamlet and
Don Quixote, he suggests that the liberal with his immobilizing
skepticism and the radical with his "half-mad" enthusiasm are each,
in their way, a "tragic extreme." Dostoevsky's and Turgenev's
determination not to confuse the personality of Nechaev with the universal
problem of "Nechaevism" has no parallel in Western studies of the
subject. It seems that the temptation is far too great to use the historical
accident of Nechaev's appearance as the basis for moral and political
generalizations which seem to clarify complex problems. The argument that
those who share some or all of Nechaev's principles are as mad or as bad as
he was may be logically flawed, but it is psychologically irresistible to
those who seek a clear and simple vision of the world, with no gray areas.
The explicit aim of works such as the one under review is to help to ensure
that history will not repeat itself; but by blunting our moral perceptions
they increase the chances that it will. |