The Hitler Myth
From Kershaw, Ian. The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 1-5.
Historians have struggled with the question of how Hitler, whose radical world view was evident from his earliest writings and speeches, could have enjoyed so much popularity in Germany. While many answers have been given to this problem, Ian Kershaw, one of the foremost scholars of the Third Reich, provides one of the most penetrating analyses of Hitler's popularity. Kershaw focuses on the skillful creation and dissemination of an image of Hitler as a "heroic" leader, which proved enormously attractive to millions of Germans. Many came to view their leader as a unifying, almost spiritual, force.
Few, if any, twentieth-century political leaders have enjoyed greater popularity among their own people than Hitler in the decade or so following his assumption of power on 30 January 1933. It has been suggested that at the peak of his popularity nine Germans in ten were "Hitler supporters, Führer believers." Whatever qualification may be needed for such a bald assertion, it can be claimed with certainty that support for the Nazi Party never approached such a level, as Nazi leaders themselves well recognized. Acclaim for Hitler went way beyond those who thought of themselves as Nazis, embracing many who were critical of the institutions, policies, and ideology of the regime. This was a factor of fundamental importance in the functioning of the Third Reich. The adulation of Hitler by millions of Germans who might otherwise have been only marginally committed to Nazism meant that the person of the Führer, as the focal point of basic consensus, formed a crucial integratory force in the Nazi system of rule. Without Hitler's massive personal popularity, the high level of plebiscitary acclamation which the regime could repeatedly call upon--legitimating its actions at home and abroad, defusing opposition, boosting the autonomy of the leadership from the traditional national-conservative elites who had imagined they would keep Hitler in check, and sustaining the frenetic and increasingly dangerous momentum of Nazi rule--is unthinkable. Most important of all, Hitler's huge platform of popularity made his own power position ever more unassailable, providing the foundation for the selective radicalization process in the Third Reich by which his personal ideological obsessions became translated into attainable reality.

Biographical concern with the details of Hitler's life and his bizarre personality . . . falls some way short of explaining the extraordinary magnetism of his popular appeal. Nor can Hitler's obsessive ideological fixations, also well known, satisfactorily account for his remarkable popularity. It would, for example, be easy to exaggerate the drawing power of anti-Semitism as the determining element in winning support for the Nazi Movement (though its functional importance as a unifying idea within the Movement is scarcely disputable). And for a population concerned with improving material conditions from the depths of the slump and overwhelmingly frightened of the prospect of another war, the idea of a coming war for Lebensraum was unlikely to have a dominant appeal. It has been plausibly suggested, therefore, that deep into the dictatorship itself Hitler's own ideological obsessions had more of a symbolic than concrete meaning for even most Nazi supporters.

What seems necessary is to add to the extensive knowledge of Hitler as a person by turning the focus on to the image of Hitler as Führer. The sources of Hitler's immense popularity have to be sought, it has rightly been claimed, "in those who adored him, rather than in the leader himself." This book tries to take a step in that direction. It is not, in fact, primarily concerned with Hitler himself, but with the propaganda image-building process, and above all with the reception of this image by the German people--how they viewed Hitler before and during the Third Reich; or, expressing it slightly differently, less what Hitler actually was than what he seemed to be to millions of Germans, within this context, as a study in political imagery, it aims to demonstrate how the "Hitler myth"--by which I mean a "heroic" image and popular conception of Hitler imputing to him characteristics and motives for the most part at crass variance with reality--served its vitally important integratory function in providing the regime with its mass base of support. . . .

The dual concerns of image-building and image-reception are closely intermeshed. There is not the slightest doubt that the "Hitler myth" was consciously devised as an integrating force by a regime acutely aware of the need to manufacture consensus. Hitler himself, as is well known, paid the greatest attention to the building of his public image. He gave great care to style and posture during speeches and other public engagements. And he was keen to avoid any hint of human failings, as in his refusal to be seen wearing spectacles or participating in any form of sport or other activity in which he might not excel and which might make him an object of amusement rather than admiration. His celibacy, which Goebbels portrayed as the sacrifice of personal happiness for the welfare of the nation, was also regarded by Hitler as a functional necessity directed at avoiding any loss of popularity among German women, whose support he saw as vital to his electoral success. All this was closely related to Hitler's known views on the "psychology of the masses," already expounded in Mein Kampf and taking a line similar to that in Gustave le Bon's writings on the almost boundless manipulability of the masses. And during the Third Reich itself, Hitler was evidently aware how important his "omnipotent" image was to his leadership position and to the strength of the regime. To this extent, it has been aptly stated that "Hitler well understood his own function, the role which he had to act out as ‘Leader' of the Third Reich," that he "transformed himself into a function, the function of Führer."

The manipulative purpose behind the "Hitler myth" was, therefore, present from the outset. It was also welcomed and furthered in quite cynical terms, for the "stupefying of the masses" and their weaning away from the lure of socialism towards an anti-socialist, counter-revolutionary mass movement, by those members of the ruling classes prepared to give active backing to the Nazi Party--though it would be easy to exaggerate the extent to which the "Hitler myth" was either built to serve, or objectively did ultimately serve, the interests of monopoly capitalism. What does seem indisputable is that the constructed "Hitler myth" was indispensable in its integrative function, firstly as a counter to the strong centrifugal forces within the Nazi Movement itself, and secondly in establishing a massive basis of consensus among the German people for those aims and policies identifiable with the Führer. And the more the objective contradictions in the social aspirations of Nazism's mass base became apparent, the greater was the functional necessity for the reification and ritualization of the "Hitler myth" in order to provide a firm base of affective integration.

Towards the end of 1941, at the height of Nazi power and domination in Europe, Goebbels claimed the creation of the "Führer myth" as his greatest propaganda achievement. He had some justification for his claim, and . . . the "Hitler myth" [was] an achievement of "image-building" by masters of the new techniques of propaganda. However, it has been rightly pointed out that the "heroic" Hitler image was "as much an image created by the masses as it was imposed on them." Propaganda was above all effective where it was building upon, not countering, already existing values and mentalities. The ready-made terrain of pre-existing beliefs, prejudices, and phobias forming an important stratum of the German political culture on to which the "Hitler myth" could easily be imprinted, provides, therefore, an equally essential element in explaining how the propaganda image of Hitler as a "representative individual" upholding the "true sense of propriety of the German people" could take hold and flourish.

By permission of Oxford University Press.