The Hitler Myth |
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From Kershaw, Ian. The
"Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987), 1-5.
Historians
have struggled with the question of how Hitler,
whose radical world view was evident from his
earliest writings and speeches, could have enjoyed
so much popularity in Germany. While many answers
have been given to this problem, Ian Kershaw, one of
the foremost scholars of the Third Reich, provides
one of the most penetrating analyses of Hitler's
popularity. Kershaw focuses on the skillful creation
and dissemination of an image of Hitler as a
"heroic" leader, which proved enormously attractive
to millions of Germans. Many came to view their
leader as a unifying, almost spiritual, force. |
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Few, if any,
twentieth-century political leaders have enjoyed greater
popularity among their own people than Hitler in the decade
or so following his assumption of power on 30 January 1933.
It has been suggested that at the peak of his popularity
nine Germans in ten were "Hitler supporters, Führer
believers." Whatever qualification may be needed for such a
bald assertion, it can be claimed with certainty that
support for the Nazi Party never approached such a level, as
Nazi leaders themselves well recognized. Acclaim for Hitler
went way beyond those who thought of themselves as Nazis,
embracing many who were critical of the institutions,
policies, and ideology of the regime. This was a factor of
fundamental importance in the functioning of the Third
Reich. The adulation of Hitler by millions of Germans who
might otherwise have been only marginally committed to
Nazism meant that the person of the Führer, as the focal
point of basic consensus, formed a crucial integratory force
in the Nazi system of rule. Without Hitler's massive
personal popularity, the high level of plebiscitary
acclamation which the regime could repeatedly call
upon--legitimating its actions at home and abroad, defusing
opposition, boosting the autonomy of the leadership from the
traditional national-conservative elites who had imagined
they would keep Hitler in check, and sustaining the frenetic
and increasingly dangerous momentum of Nazi rule--is
unthinkable. Most important of all, Hitler's huge platform
of popularity made his own power position ever more
unassailable, providing the foundation for the selective
radicalization process in the Third Reich by which his
personal ideological obsessions became translated into
attainable reality.
Biographical concern with the details of Hitler's life
and his bizarre personality . . . falls some way short of
explaining the extraordinary magnetism of his popular
appeal. Nor can Hitler's obsessive ideological fixations,
also well known, satisfactorily account for his remarkable
popularity. It would, for example, be easy to exaggerate the
drawing power of anti-Semitism as the determining element in
winning support for the Nazi Movement (though its functional
importance as a unifying idea within the Movement is
scarcely disputable). And for a population concerned with
improving material conditions from the depths of the slump
and overwhelmingly frightened of the prospect of another
war, the idea of a coming war for Lebensraum was
unlikely to have a dominant appeal. It has been plausibly
suggested, therefore, that deep into the dictatorship itself
Hitler's own ideological obsessions had more of a symbolic
than concrete meaning for even most Nazi supporters.
What seems necessary is to add to the extensive knowledge
of Hitler as a person by turning the focus on to the
image of Hitler as Führer. The sources of Hitler's
immense popularity have to be sought, it has rightly been
claimed, "in those who adored him, rather than in the leader
himself." This book tries to take a step in that direction.
It is not, in fact, primarily concerned with Hitler himself,
but with the propaganda image-building process, and above
all with the reception of this image by the German
people--how they viewed Hitler before and during the Third
Reich; or, expressing it slightly differently, less what
Hitler actually was than what he seemed to be to millions of
Germans, within this context, as a study in political
imagery, it aims to demonstrate how the "Hitler myth"--by
which I mean a "heroic" image and popular conception of
Hitler imputing to him characteristics and motives for the
most part at crass variance with reality--served its vitally
important integratory function in providing the regime with
its mass base of support. . . .
The dual concerns of image-building and image-reception
are closely intermeshed. There is not the slightest doubt
that the "Hitler myth" was consciously devised as an
integrating force by a regime acutely aware of the need to
manufacture consensus. Hitler himself, as is well known,
paid the greatest attention to the building of his public
image. He gave great care to style and posture during
speeches and other public engagements. And he was keen to
avoid any hint of human failings, as in his refusal to be
seen wearing spectacles or participating in any form of
sport or other activity in which he might not excel and
which might make him an object of amusement rather than
admiration. His celibacy, which Goebbels portrayed as the
sacrifice of personal happiness for the welfare of the
nation, was also regarded by Hitler as a functional
necessity directed at avoiding any loss of popularity among
German women, whose support he saw as vital to his electoral
success. All this was closely related to Hitler's known
views on the "psychology of the masses," already expounded
in Mein Kampf and taking a line similar to that in
Gustave le Bon's writings on the almost boundless
manipulability of the masses. And during the Third Reich
itself, Hitler was evidently aware how important his
"omnipotent" image was to his leadership position and to the
strength of the regime. To this extent, it has been aptly
stated that "Hitler well understood his own function, the
role which he had to act out as ‘Leader' of the Third
Reich," that he "transformed himself into a function, the
function of Führer."
The manipulative purpose behind the "Hitler myth" was,
therefore, present from the outset. It was also welcomed and
furthered in quite cynical terms, for the "stupefying of the
masses" and their weaning away from the lure of socialism
towards an anti-socialist, counter-revolutionary mass
movement, by those members of the ruling classes prepared to
give active backing to the Nazi Party--though it would be
easy to exaggerate the extent to which the "Hitler myth" was
either built to serve, or objectively did ultimately serve,
the interests of monopoly capitalism. What does seem
indisputable is that the constructed "Hitler myth" was
indispensable in its integrative function, firstly as a
counter to the strong centrifugal forces within the Nazi
Movement itself, and secondly in establishing a massive
basis of consensus among the German people for those aims
and policies identifiable with the Führer. And the more the
objective contradictions in the social aspirations of
Nazism's mass base became apparent, the greater was the
functional necessity for the reification and ritualization
of the "Hitler myth" in order to provide a firm base of
affective integration.
Towards the end of 1941, at the height of Nazi power and
domination in Europe, Goebbels claimed the creation of the
"Führer myth" as his greatest propaganda achievement. He had
some justification for his claim, and . . . the "Hitler
myth" [was] an achievement of "image-building" by masters of
the new techniques of propaganda. However, it has been
rightly pointed out that the "heroic" Hitler image was "as
much an image created by the masses as it was imposed on
them." Propaganda was above all effective where it was
building upon, not countering, already existing values and
mentalities. The ready-made terrain of pre-existing beliefs,
prejudices, and phobias forming an important stratum of the
German political culture on to which the "Hitler myth" could
easily be imprinted, provides, therefore, an equally
essential element in explaining how the propaganda image of
Hitler as a "representative individual" upholding the "true
sense of propriety of the German people" could take hold and
flourish. |
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By permission of Oxford University Press. |
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