Hitherto rulers have
regarded nations as patrimonies. The essential aim of all
their political arrangements has been to exploit or expand
these domains. Even those arrangements which have benefited
the governed were really conceived by the rulers only as
means of rendering their property either more productive or
more secure. The resulting advantages have been regarded
even by the people as favours, not as duties binding on the
rulers.
Undoubtedly, this situation has undergone successive
modifications, but only modifications; that is, the progress
of enlightenment has always reduced governmental action more
and more, but it has not yet changed its nature. Today this
action is exercised less freely and in a smaller sphere, but
it retains the same character. The old principle that kings
are, by divine right, the born owners of their peoples is
still accepted, at least in theory, as the fundamental
principle. This is proved by the fact that every attempt to
refute it is treated by the law as a crime against the
state.
Nevertheless, on the other hand, a new general principle
has been put forward by the governed. It has been recognized
that the rulers are only the administrators of society, that
they must direct it in conformity with the interests and
will of the ruled, and that, in short, the happiness of
nations is the sole and exclusive purpose of social
organization. This principle has been adopted by the rulers,
or at least it has already been accepted by them together
with the old principle; that is, the rulers have recognized
that they should administrate in this sense, although they
still regard themselves as born administrators. One may
consider the new principle to be established, since it is
the constitutional function of one of the three
parliamentary powers (the House of Commons) to defend it and
turn it to account.
The establishment of this principle is undoubtedly a
thoroughly capital step towards the organization of a new
political system; but nevertheless this principle cannot, in
its present state, have any really important consequence.
One cannot hide the fact that hitherto it has been only a
modifying principle, not a guiding principle. This is
because it is much too vague actually to become the basis
and point of departure of a new social order. It will not
definitely assume this character until it is stated
precisely, or rather completed. This is what we shall now
endeavor to develop and prove.
In the present situation it is acknowledged that the
permanent and sole duty of governments is to work for the
happiness of society. But how is society's happiness to be
achieved? This is a subject on which public opinion has not
yet pronounced at all, on which, perhaps, there is not even
one definite and generally accepted idea. And what has been
the result? The general direction of society is inevitably
left entirely to the arbitrary decision of the rulers. . . .
Without entering into more detailed considerations, every
person who thinks about it for a moment will be convinced
that as long as society merely orders its rulers in a vague
fashion to make it happy, without having decided how [or in
what direction] . . . [its direction and] rule will
inevitably be arbitrary. . . .
In the new political order, the sole and permanent object
of social organization should be to apply as well as
possible the knowledge acquired in the sciences, fine arts,
and arts and crafts to the satisfaction of men's needs; to
disseminate that knowledge, improve it and increase it as
much as possible; in short, to combine [it all] in as useful
a way as possible. . . .
Hitherto men have, so to speak, exercised on nature only
purely individual and isolated efforts. Furthermore, their
forces have always in large measure destroyed each other,
since the human race has hitherto been divided into two
unequal parts, and the smaller has constantly employed all
its power, and often even some of the power of the larger
part, in order to dominate the latter, while the larger part
has used up a great deal of its power in order to withstand
domination. Nevertheless, it is certain that in spite of
this enormous loss of power, the human race has, in the most
civilized countries, achieved a quite remarkable degree of
comfort and prosperity. From this one may judge the level it
would reach if almost no power were lost, if men, instead of
commanding one another, organized themselves to exercise
their combined effort on nature, and if nations adopted the
same system! . . .
In a society organized for the positive aim of working
for its prosperity through the sciences, fine arts, and arts
and crafts, the most important political act, the act which
involves determining the direction in which society is to
advance, no longer belongs to men invested [only] with
social functions; it is exercised by the social body itself,
in such a way that society, taken collectively, can really
exercise [a] sovereignty . . . which then consists not in an
arbitrary opinion established in law . . . but in a
principle derived from the very nature of things, whose
justice men have only to recognize and whose necessity they
have only to proclaim. . . . The act of governing, in the
sense of commanding, plays no or almost no part. All the
questions which have to be debated in such a political
system . . . are eminently positive and answerable; [the
correct] decisions can only be the result of scientific
demonstrations, absolutely independent of all human will,
which may be discussed by those educated enough to
understand them. . . . And just as every question of social
interest will then inevitably be decided as well as it can
be with acquired knowledge, so will all social functions be
entrusted to the men most capable of performing them in
conformity with the association's general aim. Thus . . .
the three principal disadvantages of the present political
system--arbitrariness, incapacity, and intrigue--will be
seen to disappear at once.
. . . The functions which are peculiarly concerned with
maintenance of social order will be classed . . . only
according to their natural rank, as subordinate police
functions.
. . . This part of social action is the only one in the
new system requiring a certain degree of command in
relations between men, since all the rest . . . involve the
action of principles. It follows that the action of
governing . . . will then be limited as much as possible. In
this order men will consequently enjoy the highest degree of
liberty compatible with the state of society. It must also
be noted that this function of maintaining order can then
easily become, almost entirely, a task shared by all
citizens, whether it be to contain trouble-makers or to
settle disputes. . . .