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"The Course of World
History" |
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From Hegel, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich. Reason in History. trans. Robert S.
Hartman, ed. Robert S. Hartman (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1953), 68-71.
The German
philosopher Georg Hegel (1770-1831) was born in
Stuttgart and studied in Tübingen. After various
teaching posts he became professor of philosophy in
Berlin. Hegel devoted much of his thought to the
philosophy of history. An "Idealist," Hegel viewed
history as a dialectical process of thesis,
antithesis, and synthesis, which amounted to the
evolution of Spirit, or God. Hegel's view of the
struggling progression of the Spirit seems partly
indebted to Schleiermacher's emphasis on the primacy
of religious consciousness in human affairs; and
Karl Marx, while rejecting Hegel's "Idealism,"
nevertheless appropriated his vision of history as
an evolutionary process. |
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Historical change, seen
abstractly, has long been understood generally as involving
a progress towards the better, the more perfect. Change in
nature, no matter how infinitely varied it is, shows only a
cycle of constant repetition. In nature nothing new happens
under the sun, and in this respect the multiform play of her
products leads to boredom. One and the same permanent
character continuously reappears, and all change reverts to
it. Only the changes in the realm of Spirit create the
novel. This characteristic of Spirit suggested to man a
feature entirely different from that of nature--the desire
toward perfectibility. This principle, which brings
change itself under laws, has been badly received by
religions such as the Catholic and also by states which
desire as their true right to be static or at least stable.
When the mutability of secular things, such as states, is
conceded on principle, then religion, as religion of truth,
is excluded. On the other hand, one leaves undecided whether
changes, revolutions, and destructions of legitimate
conditions are not due to accidents, blunders, and, in
particular, the license and evil passions of men. Actually,
perfectibility is something almost as undetermined as
mutability in general; it is without aim and purpose and
without a standard of change. The better, the more perfect
towards which it is supposed to attain, is entirely
undetermined.
The principle of development implies further that
it is based on an inner principle, a presupposed
potentiality, which brings itself into existence. This
formal determination is essentially the Spirit whose scene,
property, and sphere of realization is world history. It
does not flounder about in the external play of accidents.
On the contrary, it is absolutely determined and firm
against them. But development is also a property of organic
natural objects. Their existence is not merely dependent,
subject to external influences. It proceeds rather from an
inner immutable principle, a simple essence, which first
exists as a germ. From this simple existence it brings forth
out of itself differentiations which connect it with other
things. Thus it lives a life of continuous transformation.
On the other hand, we may look at it from the opposite point
of view and see in it the preservation of the organic
principle and its form. Thus the organic individual produces
itself; it makes itself, and it makes itself actually into
that which it is in itself (potentially). The development of
the organism proceeds in an immediate, direct (undialectic),
unhindered manner. Nothing can interfere between the concept
and its realization, the inherent nature of the germ and the
adaptation of its existence to this nature. It is different
with Spirit. The transition of its potentiality into
actuality is mediated through consciousness and will. These
are themselves first immersed in their immediate organic
life; their first object and purpose is this natural
existence as such. But the latter, through its animation by
Spirit, becomes itself infinitely demanding, rich, and
strong. Thus Spirit is at war with itself. It must overcome
itself as its own enemy and formidable obstacle.
Development, which in nature is a quiet unfolding, is in
Spirit a hard, infinite struggle against itself. What Spirit
wants is to attain its own concept. But it hides it from
itself and is proud and full of enjoyment at this alienation
from itself.
Historical development, therefore, is not the harmless
and unopposed simple growth of organic life but hard,
unwilling labor against itself. Furthermore, it is not mere
formal self-development in general, but the production of an
end of determined content. This end we have stated from the
beginning: it is Spirit in its essence, the concept of
freedom. This is the fundamental object and hence the
leading principle of development. Through it the development
receives meaning and significance--just as in Roman history
Rome is the object and hence the guiding principle of the
inquiry into past events. At the same time, however, the
events arise out of this object and have meaning and content
only with reference to it.
There are in world history several large periods which
have passed away, apparently without further development.
Their whole enormous gain of culture has been annihilated
and, unfortunately, one had to start all over from the
beginning in order to reach again one of the levels of
culture which had been reached long ago--assisted, perhaps,
by some ruins saved of old treasures--with a new,
immeasurable effort of power and time, of crime and
suffering. On the other hand, there are continuing
developments, structures, and systems of culture in
particular spheres, rich in kind and well-developed in every
direction. The merely formal view of development can give
preference neither to one course nor the other; nor can it
account for the purpose of that decline of older periods. It
must consider such events, and in particular such reversals,
as external accidents. It can judge the relative advantages
only according to indefinite viewpoints--viewpoints which
are relative precisely because development in general
is viewed as the one and only purpose.
World history, then, represents the phases in the
development of the principle whose content is the
consciousness of freedom. The analysis of its stages in
general belongs to Logic. That of its particular, its
concrete nature, belongs to the Philosophy of Spirit. Let us
only repeat here that the first stage is the immersion of
Spirit in natural life, the second its stepping out into the
consciousness of its freedom. This first emancipation from
nature is incomplete and partial; it issues from immediate
naturalness, still refers to it, and hence is still
encumbered by it as one of its elements. The third stage is
the rising out of this still particular form of freedom into
pure universality of freedom, where the spiritual essence
attains the consciousness and feeling of itself. These
stages are the fundamental principles of the universal
process. Each is again, within itself, a process of its own
formation. But the detail of this inner dialectic of
transition must be left to the sequel.
All we have to indicate here is that Spirit begins with
its infinite possibility, but only its possibility.
As such it contains its absolute content within itself, as
its aim and goal, which it attains only as result of its
activity. Then and only then has Spirit attained its
reality. Thus, in existence, progress appears as an advance
from the imperfect to the more perfect. But the former must
not only be taken in abstraction as the merely imperfect,
but as that which contains at the same time its own
opposite, the so-called perfect, as germ, as urge within
itself. In the same way, at least in thought, possibility
points to something which shall become real; more precisely,
the Aristotelian dynamis is also potentia,
force and power. The imperfect, thus, as the opposite of
itself in itself, is its own antithesis, which on the one
hand exists, but, on the other, is annulled and resolved. It
is the urge, the impulse of spiritual life in itself, to
break through the hull of nature, of sensuousness, of its
own self-alienation, and to attain the light of
consciousness, namely, its own self.
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