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Bacon's Reasoning Francis of Verulam
reasoned thus with himself, and judged it to be for the interest of the
present and future generations that they should be made acquainted with his
thoughts. Being convinced that the human
intellect makes its own difficulties, not using the true helps which are at a
man's disposal soberly and judiciously; whence follows manifold ignorance of
things, and by reason of that ignorance mischiefs innumerable; he thought all
trial should be made, whether that commerce between the mind of man and the
nature of things, which is more precious than anything on earth, might by any
means be restored to its perfect and original condition, or if that may not
be, yet reduced to a better condition than that in which it now is. Now that
the errors which have hitherto prevailed, and which will prevail forever, should
(if the mind be left to go its own way), either by the natural force of the
understanding or by help of the aids and instruments of Logic, one by one
correct themselves, was a thing not to be hoped for: because the primary
notions of things which the mind readily and passively imbibes, stores up,
and accumulates (and it is from them that all the rest flow) are false,
confused, and overhastily abstracted from the
facts; nor are the secondary and subsequent notions less arbitrary and
inconstant; whence it follows that the entire fabric of human reason which we
employ in the inquisition of nature, is badly put together and built up, and
like some magnificent structure without any foundation. For while men are
occupied in admiring and applauding the false powers of the mind, they pass
by and throw away those true powers, which, if it be supplied with the proper
aids and can itself be content to wait upon nature instead of vainly
affecting to overrule her, are within its reach. There was but one course
left, therefore, –-to try the whole thing anew upon a better plan, and to
commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all human knowledge,
raised upon the proper foundations. And this, though in the project and
undertaking it may seem a thing infinite and beyond the powers of man, yet
when it comes to be dealt with it will be found sound and sober, more so than
what has been done hitherto. For of this there is some issue; whereas in what
is now done in the matter of science there is only a whirling round about, and perpetual agitation, ending where it began. And
although he was well aware of how solitary an enterprise it is, and how hard
a thing to win faith and credit for, nevertheless he was resolved not to
abandon either it or himself; nor to be deterred from trying and entering
upon that one path which is alone open to the human mind. For better it is to
make a beginning of that which may lead to something, than to engage in a
perpetual struggle and pursuit in courses which have no exit. And certainly
the two ways of contemplation are much like those two ways of action, so much
celebrated, in this–-that the one, arduous and difficult in the beginning,
leads out at last into the open country; while the other, seeming at first
sight easy and free from obstruction, leads to pathless and precipitous
places. Moreover, because he knew not how
long it might be before these things would occur to any
one else, judging especially from this, that he has found no man
hitherto who has applied his mind to the like, he resolved to publish at once
so much as he has been able to complete. The cause of which haste was not
ambition for himself, but solicitude for the work; that in case of his death
there might remain some outline and project of that which he had conceived,
and some evidence likewise of his honest mind and inclination towards the
benefit of the human race. Certain it is that all other ambition whatsoever
seemed poor in his eyes compared with the work which he had in hand; seeing
that the matter at issue is either nothing, or a thing so great that it may
well be content with its own merit, without seeking other recompence. |
