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The Process of Unification
Grempel
For reasons of economy the annual recruitment for the army had not been
increased, despite the fact that the population of Prussia had doubled since
1815. So in practice no universal military service existed and some 24,000
draft-age youth escaped military service each year. There was some
traditional antimilitarist sentiment among Prussian liberals, that accounts for
this, but the equally traditional economy-mindedness of laissez faire
liberalism also played a role.
Perhaps, this antimilitarist sentiment was not as powerful as some have
alleged, since the crux of the problem turned cut to be a political issue. In
short, William I did not trust the Landwehr
(Prussian army).
I.
The Landwehr Problem
William wanted a tightly-knit officer corps, which he considered to be the
best protection against the popular wish of his people for freedom and
self-government. William wanted to keep recruits for a period of three years,
instead of the normal two, in order to give him time to develop loyalty to
the crown among the soldiers. The opposition, on the other band, thought of
the Landwehr as an expression of a more popular and
liberal regime.
The Army Bill, introduced in the Prussian Landtag
(diet) on February 10, 1860, sought an increase of 39 infantry divisions and
10 cavalry regiments. This, in fact, would have made military service
compulsory. Parity between the new recruits (the line) and the Landwehr was thus abandoned. Latter the Landwehr would have come under the command of line
officers. The Landwehr would thus have been
separated from the field army. The military establishment did accept the
increase in army size, but they also retained the Landwehr
as such and the traditional two-year service period.
The government of Prussia then did something that could hardly have been done
anywhere else. It used the 9 million thaler grant
to proceed on the reform without having explicit authorization from the Landtag. This lead to a deadlock between government and
diet. A new diet in 1861 refused to pass the reform bill or to increase the
size of the general budget. The so-called "new era" in Prussia then
came to an end with the resignation of the liberal Auerswald
Ministry.
Another diet in 1862 was elected with an even greater block of
representatives from the Progressive Party, now powerful enough to attempt
major constitutional reform by using the Landwehr
issue. The new Landtag wanted to reduce the power
of the upper house of the diet, since it was the lever of government
manipulation. An impasse had been reached and the king was desperate.
II.
The Arrival of Bismarck
At this point Bismarck was brought into the picture. He was what the Germans
call a Herrennatur (dominant personality). As an
old-fashioned landed aristocrat, Bismarck had absolutely no sympathy for
urban, bourgeois life. From the start he believe
that force against Austria was necessary to push her out of the scene and
then unify Germany without Austria. As a matter of tactic, he believed that
one had to bring any situation to such a point that improvement became an
absolute necessity. He also believed, and this is important, that foreign
policy always determined domestic policy. The Germans call this das Primat der Aussenpolitik
(the primacy of foreign policy).
On September 30, 1862 Bismarck made his famous iron and blood speech before
the budget commission, where the army bill was bottled up. He said, in effect,
that no amount of debating and negotiating is ever going to unify Germany; if
she is s going to be unified it will have to be done by military force. He
then practiced what he preached by withdrawing the budget proposal and
ordering the government bureaucracy to collect taxes without Diet
authorization. No minister before him had had the courage to do such a thing.
To rationalize his actions he developed the new "theory of the gap"
(Lücke): there was no provision in the constitution
that tells us which of the three institutions (upper house, lower house, crown) must yield when no agreement exists among them.
Since the state must continue to live, the government simply has to collect
taxes and spend them.
Simultaneously, Bismarck launched a loud campaign against the liberal
opposition in the Diet and the press. Public sentiment at this point was
largely lined up against the government. Even Crown Prince Frederick
disassociated himself pointedly from the repressive measures Bismarck pushed.
It was Ferdinand Lasalle, the father of German
socialism, who showed how the Prussian situation (unlike the English) made it
possible for the people to continue paying taxes without parliamentary
authorization. Respect for monarchical authority and a deeply ingrained sense
of obedience to superiors did the trick for Bismarck. He knew his fellow
countrymen well. Then foreign wars and nationalist issues interfered to
overshadow the progress of German liberalism.
III.
The Wars of Unification
Bismarck had to fight three wars to unify Germany. The 1864 Danish War helped
Bismarck consolidate his internal position in Prussia. The War of 1866 ousted
Austria from leadership in Germany for good. The Franco-Prussian War of
1870-71 brought the South under the aegis of the Prussian eagle. That was the
unification process in a nutshell. Now let us look at it in some detail.
A.
The Danish War: 1864-1865
Liberal sentiment in Germany had always been stirred by a desire to separate
Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark. The liberals called for a repudiation of
international agreements by Prussia (such as the 1852 Protocol which put the
Danish issue on ice) , while Bismarck declared in
the Diet that he would not be a party to a breach of international
obligations. So Bismarck made an agreement with Austria, the avowed enemy of
German unity, to proceed within the context of the 1852 Protocol"
The two powers then sent an ultimatum to Denmark on January 16, 1864
demanding a withdrawal of the constitution of Nov. 18 (which incorporated
Schleswig in Denmark) within 48 hours or face military action. Denmark,
counting on the support of the European Powers, rejected the ultimatum"
France hesitated to join England, which refused to act alone. So the powers
did nothing. An attempt at mediation also failed. Denmark was therefore
reduced to submission by Prussian and Austrian military force.
In the Treaty of Gastein (Aug. 1865) Prussia and
Austria decided how to dispose of the acquired duchies. The two powers
decided to rule the two duchies jointly, with Austria administering Holstein
and Prussia administering Schleswig. Prussia was given certain military roads
through Holstein and command of Kiel, which was to be a port of the German
Confederation. Both duchies were compelled to join the Zollverein, which was
of course to Prussia's benefit since she controlled the customs union for all
practical purposes.
But that was not all; Prussia also annexed Lauenburg,
although she paid a price of 2.5 million thaler for
it. The German claimant to the throne of the two duchies, Augustenberg,
was completely ignored. All this seemed fair enough, although Prussia
obviously got the better end of the stick. But Bismarck had no intention of
leaving things as they were. It is surprising that the statesmen of Austria
did not see this.
B.
The Prusso-Austrian War: 1866
Bismarck believed that trouble and eventual war with Austria would be
inevitable. His entire policy from 1863 to 1866 was predicated on war with
Austria. He had made sure that Russia would not intervene when he Russia
would not intervene when he sympathized with Russia in crushing the Polish
revolution of 1863. Napoleon III was maneuvered into a favorable position by
all kinds of vague promises for territorial aggrandizement in 1865. An
alliance with Italy was made in April, 1866, through Napoleon's assistance,
which stipulated that Italy would come to the aid of Prussia if a war with
Austria broke out in three months. Bismarck also tried to get Bavarian
support but failed.
It is interesting that not a single German state was with Prussia when the
war actually came. The liberal and progressive majority in the Prussian diet
was somewhat mollified after the Banish wag, but still actively opposed to
the government. Bismarck then adopted some Caesarism
from Napoleon III and Disreali.
He presented a plan to the Confederate Diet in April, 1866, which called for
the acceptance of the 1849 electoral laws, including universal equal and
secret ballot. It was a tactical move to embarrass Austria since he knew
Austria would oppose the planned reform. He really believed that universal
suffrage would work to his advantage, hoping that the clergy and the
landowners would be able to win the peasants to the conservative side. The
growth of the worker movement would also help since Lasalle
was the chief enemy of the liberals, whose main support came from the upper
bourgeoisie. In fact Bismarck and Lasalle had
several important talks which increased Bismarck's confidence that his gambit
would work.
Bismarck then moved towards the showdown by accusing Austria of arming and
troop movements in Bohemia. He called it "seditious agitation" and
further accused Austria of supporting the unlucky Augustenburg.
Strangely enough when the Prussian king put pressure on Vienna, Austria
seemed willing to disarm, but false rumors that Italy was arming scared
Austria and moved her in the opposite direction. So Austria mobilized first
and at the same time brought the various minor problems which had developed
over Schleswig-Holstein before the Federal Diet in order to gain the support
of the other German states. Bismarck immediately cried that this was a breach
of the Gastein Convention. When Austria shortly
thereafter convoked the Holstein diet, Prussian troops marched into Holstein.
Austria called on the armies of the Confederation to act against what it
called illegal actions of Prussia in Holstein.
Meanwhile Bismarck presented a new plan for the reorganization of the
Confederation. This was laid on the table about the same time that Bavaria
proposed to choose a commander for the Confederate armies and to mobilized the forces of the smaller states. When the
Bavarian proposal won by a vote of 9 to 6 the Prussian delegate declared the
Confederation dissolved and the existence of a state of war.
It was a quick war--three weeks in duration. Sadowa
or Königgratz in Bohemia was the crucial battle
which turned into an easy victory for Prussia, thanks to excellent
organization and the famous new needle gun. The king, who had been hesitant
before now wanted to invade Austria, but Bismarck, the ever-calculating
diplomat, demurred. He knew the value of restraint. He was not interested in
crushing Austria but in removing her from German politics. Baden and
Württemberg were treated most leniently. Bavaria was forced to sign a secret
treaty to aid Prussia in any future war with France.
The North German Confederation was formed by the annexation of various
smaller states and the unavoidable adhesion of some larger states north of
the Main river. The whole business was considered to be a revolution by most
contemporary observers. What the liberals bad dreamed of for five decades,
Bismarck achieved in three short weeks. Austria was permanently eliminated
from German affairs.
Only some South German Catholic leaders and the socialists remained critical
of Bismarck. Success had turned most of his former enemies into friends and
admirers. The new Prussian diet elected on the day of the Battle of Königgratz showed a decided shift to the Right. William
claimed that the victory was due to his army reforms.
An Indemnity Bill passed the new diet 230 to 75, with the Poles, Catholics
and Progressives voting against. This strange little maneuver legalized the
budgets of 1862 to 1864, allocated 154,000,000 thalers
for 1866 and confirmed the government promise to produce periodic
expenditures and receipts for money spent. A further vote of confidence on
the conduct of foreign affairs also passed 230 to 83. The memory of
Bismarck's triumph was a powerful factor in sapping the strength and vitality
of German parliamentary life for years to come.
C.
The Franco-Prussian War: 1870-1871
But Germany was not yet fully unified. The South remained outside the fold
and here is where France and Napoleon III came into the picture. Napoleon was
vulnerable. He was forced to modify the traditional Richelieuan
policy toward Germany because of his nationalities doctrine. But Napoleon's
policy was still somewhat equivocal on German unification, as if he could not
decide which was more important his belief in national self-determination or
to keep France stronger than the new Germany would be. Bismarck however
helped him to decide when he outmaneuvered Napoleon on the Luxembourg and
Belgian issue. These disappointments plus the failure of the Mexican venture
made Napoleon determined to have some kind of diplomatic triumph.
French policy on the whole was jittery and erratic, reflecting Napoleon"s uncertain position at home. French public
opinion was not very militant. Ollivier and Gramont, the chief political leaders, preferred peace,
but certain "statesmen" in France made mistakes. There were
premature threats of war, there were impudent demands made on the Germans
(particularly on July 12, 1870) and there was serious misinterpretation of
French public opinion. Nevertheless, he who thinks war is necessary is
responsible for it and Bismarck thought it was necessary to bring the South
of Germany into the union.
Now, strange as it may seem, the Franco-Prussian War actually began in Spain.
Queen Isabella was dethroned by a military coup in 1868. The Spanish
parliament then began to look for candidates to replace her. Prince Leopold
von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen became one of the
candidates. Bismarck was the prince's chief promoter, since he believed it
would bring on the war he had failed to trigger over the Luxembourg affair of
1867. The news of Leopold's acceptance of the Spanish crown hit France like a
bombshell on July 2. Gramont, the foreign minister
made vague threats in the French Corp Legislatif:
"We should know how to do our duty."
On July 9 the French ambassador Benedetti interviewed King William who was
taking the bath at Bad Ems in Southwest Germany. The King apparently was
persuaded by Benedetti to force Leopold to retract his candidacy. So on duly 12
Leopold retracts, being a good and obedient member of the Hohenzollern
family. Now the matter should have rested there. But the French began to
blunder and Bismarck's ingenuity fanned the embers of bad feeling into the
flame of war.
Gramont was not satisfied with Benedetti's
accomplishment. So Bennedetti was sent to see the
king again and demand an unequivocal promise never to allow Leopold to renew
his candidacy. Gramont was out for a big diplomatic
triumph and so he played a game of tremendous risk, underestimating
Bismarck's cleverness. Benedetti tried to see the king again, but the latter
refused to grant him an audience. However, on duly 13 the king was taking a
stroll through the park when Benedetti suddenly materialized from among the
trees to accuse the king and make his demand for a definite promise. The king
politely refused to make such a promise. A report of the affair was sent to
Bismarck in Berlin by an official with the Kings's
authority.
When Bismarck read this famous Ems Telegram he immediately saw his
opportunity. By clever abridgement of the Ems dispatch Bismarck achieved a
terse and sharply worded text which made it look like outright provocation on
the part of France. He had it published in the newspapers, saying that it
would have the effect of a red cloth upon the Gallic bull. That is exactly
the effect it had since the French considered the doctored telegram a
provocation. On duly 19 France declared war on the North German
Confederation.
Only Bavaria hesitated for a moment in joining Bismarck:s war. Russia promised neutrality. England became
neutral when Bismarck published Benedetti's plan for the annexation of
Belgium which had been worked out with Bismarck.s
benign approval right after the Battle of Königsgratz.
The war did not last long. The fortress of Sedan fell on September 2, 1870
and the Emperor Napoleon walked across the German lines with his hands high
in the air. Now a revolution broke out in Paris and Paris did not surrender
until January 28, 1871. The Peace of Frankfurt was concluded on May 10.
France had to pay an indemnity of 5 billion francs. East Lorraine had to be
surrendered to Germany although Bismarck showed no great enthusiasm for
taking them until certain industrialists pointed out their economic and hence
military value. Northern France was occupied until 1873, when the indemnity
was completely paid.
On January 18, 1871 William was crowned as the Emperor of Germany in the
French Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. The Germans know how to add insult to
injury and thus lay the groundwork for future wars. Victor Hugo made a
profound prophesy at this time that France would retake Alsace and Lorraine
and even the Rhineland and make Germany a republic.
Send comments and questions to Professor Gerhard Rempel,
Western New England College.
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