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The focus in this
essay is on how Bismarck dealt with the various forms of internal
opposition encountered, and how successful h=
e was
with his measures.
When Otto Fürst von Bismarck-Schönhaus=
en
became the first Chancellor of the German Reich in 1871, his position w=
as
undisputed. The German people saw in him their national hero who had ma=
de
possible the formation of a kleindeutsch
German Reich, established by an overwhelming victory in the 1870/71 war
against France. For the first three to four years after the unification,
Bismarck's prestige did not descend from its peak as French war-indemni=
ty
payments caused a boom for the German economy and public opinion was st=
ill
caught up in national ecstasy over Bismarck's achievements. However, in=
the
mid-1870s three factors worked together in removing the chancellor from=
his
superior position and putting him under political pressure. Firstly,
recession set in caused by the end of French war-reparations. The tempo=
rary
abundance of capital had not been used efficiently by German industrial=
s,
and their success declined rapidly with the absence of French capital.
Parallel to these economic problems evolved the discontent of the worki=
ng
class with the living conditions they had to succumb to under Bismarck =
and
Wilhelm I. They gave their support mainly to the Social Democratic Party
(SPD) with the hope for social reforms and the establishment of trade
unions. Thirdly, Bismarck's Kulturkampf aga=
inst
German Catholics was met by the public with discontent and alienated ma=
ny
of his supporters. The focus in this essay is on how Bismarck dealt with
the various forms of internal opposition encountere=
d,
and how successful he was with his measures.
The constitut=
ion
of the German Reich was a bastion of strength for Bismarck. Even though=
it
was designed to give the impression that power was shared equally betwe=
en
the emperor and the chancellor, Bismarck had the upper hand in all cruc=
ial
decision making as he was adept at convincing Wilhelm of the correctnes=
s of
his policy. Being responsible only to the Kaiser himself, Bismarck's
policies were not threatened by the Reichstag which had relatively litt=
le
influence. "It had the power to initiate debate upon any point of =
his
policy, but neither he nor any other minister was responsible to the
assembly for his actions" (T. A. Morris, p116). The only issue whe=
re
the Reichstag could inflict severely on Bismarck was the alteration of =
the
military budget, for this decision was, according to the constitution, =
in
the hands of the Imperial Assembly. However, because of fear of the
emergence of another constitutional conflict like the one that was reso=
lved
by Bismarck in 1862, its members agreed from 1874 to 1881 to approve the
budget envisioned by Bismarck. Any other decisions that had potential to
conflict with the chancellor were not likely to even be made, as 17 out=
of
the 58 deputies were Prussian, and thereby predominantly inclined to fa=
vor
a pro-Bismarckian policy. These factors ind=
icate
how it was almost impossible for an opposition to block the ![3D"Description:](3D"BismarckEssay.htm_files/image001.gif") way of Bismar=
ck,
who did not have to seek the consent of anybody but the easily convinced
Emperor.
Nevertheless =
it
seemed favorable to Bismarck, who was not member of any party himself, =
to
be supported by a strong grouping in the Reichstag. From 1871 to 1878, a
period frequently described as his liberal era, Bismarck sought coopera=
tion
with the National Liberals. These were broadly sympathetic to the
chancellor because he had brought about national unity, the party's maj=
or
policy aim, and also because many short-term goals of the two partners
coincided - most notably "consolidation of that national unity and=
the
centralization of the administration of the Reich" (Morris, p118).
However, the collaboration was by no means a complete symbiosis. In 187=
4,
for example, Bismarck's Press Law enabled for easier prosecution of edi=
tors
by the government; a law very much opposed to liberal ideals. The Natio=
nal
Liberals never received from the chancellor any immediate political pow=
er;
a fact that lets the collaboration appear more like exploitation at the
hands of Bismarck. His association with the National Liberals strengthe=
ned
his position by giving him a strong presence in the Reichstag, and can
therefore be seen as a preventive means of dealing with internal
opposition.
Perceived by
Bismarck as a threat to the integrity of the German Reich was the German
Catholic minority. Several reasons may have contributed to the chancell=
or
viewing this group and its political extension, the Center Party, as a
dangerous source of opposition. Firstly, the Catholics had proven to be
opposed to the liberal policy which coated Bismarck up to 1878. Also, t=
hey
were under the moral influence of the Pope and therefore did not seem t=
o be
reliable subjects of the Kaiser. Probably their greatest misfortune was
that their views and policies were not acceptable to Bismarck. To combat
these Reichsfeinde, "enemies of the
people", Bismarck launched Kulturkampf=
, the
"struggle for civilization", which had at its core the ambiti=
on
to annihilate Catholic influence throughout the German Reich. Most
notorious of Kulturkampf were the 'May Laws=
', a
set of laws aimed directly at diminishing the influence which the German
Catholic Church enjoyed. Introduced in 1872 by the Minister of Religious
Affairs, Adalbert Falk, the May Laws brought
education entirely under state control and placed the Catholic Clergy u=
nder
strict supervision. Catholics in Germany had to live with the governmen=
tal
accusation of being enemies of their own fatherland. His way of dealing
with the German Catholics is as a strong indicator of why Bismarck was =
referred
to as the "Iron Chancellor". His rigorou=
sity
in fighting whom he perceived as his enemy was extreme and lacked any
willingness to compromise unless circumstances forced him to do so.
By 1878, Bism=
arck
had sensed the general discontent of many highly influential groups wit=
hin
the Reich. Public opinion demanded protective tariffs to strengthen
endangered industrial ambitions, and as a result, the chancellor's tend=
ency
to liberalism was openly challenged. Bismarck reacted with the second of
his two most remarkable features - second to his rigor was only his
opportunism. He conducted a dramatic change from liberalism to
conservatism, deserting the too demanding National Liberals and strengt=
hening
his own position by succumbing to the strong demand for conservative
politics. Protective tariffs were introduced in 1879 and Bismarck's
position as chancellor was confirmed. During this process, he was also =
able
to retract his call for Kulturkampf and the=
bulk
of the May Laws established in 1872 - the clash with the Catholic Church
had proven to be a complete failure. Support for the Catholics and part=
ial
outrage at his uncompromising severity had threatened to severely damage
the support he enjoyed and thus forced him to abandon the attempted
annihilation of Catholic influence in the German Reich.
Growing too
strong in Bismarck's eyes was the Social Democratic Party, which he
regarded with severe ideological and personal contempt. The SPD's polic=
ies
collided with those of conservative Bismarck, who was eager to ridden himself of the advancing socialists. His
opportunity came in 1878, when two attempts upon the life of the Kaiser
enabled him to direct the nation's patriotism against his political foe=
s.
He dissolved the Reichstag to hold fresh elections, in which those whom=
he
charged with the attempted assassinations were bound to be the losers. =
To
get rid of socialism once and for all, Sozialisten=
gesetze
(anti-socialist measures) were passed on October 19th 1878. Even though
these measures did not ban the SPD completely, they prohibited the party
from meeting and disseminating its doctrine.
Despite his
dislike of socialism and the extreme measures employed to contain the S=
PD,
Bismarck was aware that the demand for socialist reform was a threat he
could not quite as easily eradicate. Most workers had to live under
undeniably dreadful conditions, and when the uproar that had followed t=
he
attempts on the Kaiser's life ended, the workers would present a most
dangerous problem. Bismarck realized that socialism could not be conque=
red
by oppression alone and embarked on a program of "state
socialism" which was to improve the conditions of the German worke=
rs.
In 1883, medical insurance and sick pay were introduced, and 1889 saw t=
he
introduction of old-age pensions. Reforms brought about by state social=
ism
were by no means as advantageous for the workers as similar reforms by =
the
SPD would have been, but they sufficed to pacify the proletariat and th=
ose
critics of the chancellor who had blamed him for disregarding public ne=
eds.
Bismarck's wa=
y of
dealing with internal opposition during his chancellorship in the German
Reich from 1871 to 1890 is marked primarily by his rigor and opportunis=
m,
but also by most adept planning. Already the constitution prohibited,
theoretically, any threat from below to attain too much influence. With=
the
Reichstag unable to effectively oppose Bismarck, only the Kaiser had the
power to dispose of the chancellor - a threat that, during the lifetime=
of
Wilhelm I, did not exist due to the predominantly smooth understanding
between the two German leaders. When a threat from below had potential =
to
endanger Bismarck's position, he would try to nip it in the bud. Exampl=
es
of his uncompromising severity regarding political opposition can be se=
en
in the May Laws and the Sozialistengesetze -
threats were to be eradicated promptly and finally. The French politici=
an
Emile Ollivier emphasizes this picture by
displaying Bismarck as a "machiavellian and
immoral power politician". Bismarck's undeniably unethical way of
treating internal opposition was replenished by his opportunism. The ab=
rupt
change from liberalism to conservatism, the tacking back of the May Laws
and the granting of socialist reforms support the view that Bismarck did
not have a master plan; not even a firm ideological inclination, but did
all he had to in order to remain the effective leader of the German Rei=
ch.
I identify his way of dealing with internal opposition with flexibility
rather than sole opportunism - while it has to be admitted that he was
unethical in his methods, he was succumbing to the broad demands of the
public only to be able to carry out the foreign politics necessary to
secure the German Reich for the future. By combining rigor with
flexibility, Bismarck effectively kept internal opposition under control
between 1871 and 1890.
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