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Ancient History Sourcebook: Inasmuch as philosophers only are
able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the
region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you which of
the two classes should be the rulers of our State? And how can we rightly
answer that question? Whichever of the two are
best able to guard the laws and institutions of our State--let them be our
guardians. Very good. Neither, I said, can there
be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes
rather than no eyes? There can be no question of
that. And are not those who are
verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the true being of each thing,
and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a
painter's eye to look at the absolute truth and to that original to repair,
and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty,
goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve
the order of them--are not such persons, I ask, simply blind? Truly, he replied, they are
much in that condition. And shall they be our
guardians when there are others who, besides being their equals in experience
and falling short of them in no particular of virtue, also know the very
truth of each thing? There can be no reason, he
said, for rejecting those who have this greatest of all great qualities; they
must always have the first place unless they fail in some other respect.
Suppose, then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and the
other excellences. By all means. In the first place, as we
began by observing, the nature of the philosopher has to be ascertained. We
must come to an understanding about him, and, when we have done so, then, if
I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge that such a union of qualities
is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and those only, should
be rulers in the State. What do you mean? Let us suppose that
philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which shows them the
eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption. Agreed. And further, I said, let us
agree that they are lovers of all true being; there is no part whether greater
or less, or more or less honorable, which they are willing to renounce; as we
said before of the lover and the man of ambition. True. And if they are to be what
we were describing, is there not another quality which they should also
possess? What quality? Truthfulness: they will
never intentionally receive into their minds falsehood, which is their
detestation, and they will love the truth. Yes, that may be safely
affirmed of them. "May be." my
friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather, "must be affirmed:"
for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot
help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections. Right, he said. And is there anything more
akin to wisdom than truth? How can there be? Can the same nature be a
lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood? Never. The true lover of learning
then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth? Assuredly. But then again, as we know
by experience, he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them
weaker in others; they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into
another channel. True. He whose desires are drawn
toward knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul,
and will hardly feel bodily pleasure--I mean, if he be a true philosopher and
not a sham one. That is most certain. Such a one is sure to be
temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the motives which make another man
desirous of having and spending, have no place in his character. Very true. Another criterion of the
philosophical nature has also to be considered. What is that? There should be no secret
corner of illiberality; nothing can be more antagonistic than meanness to a
soul which is ever longing after the whole of things both divine and human. Most true, he replied. Then how can he who has
magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence,
think much of human life? He cannot. Or can such a one account
death fearful? No, indeed. Then the cowardly and mean
nature has no part in true philosophy? Certainly not. Or again: can he who is
harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or mean, or a boaster, or a
coward--can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in his dealings? Impossible. Then you will soon observe
whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and unsociable; these are the signs
which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the
unphilosophical. True. There is another point
which should be remarked. What point? Whether he has or has not a
pleasure in learning; for no one will love that which gives him pain, and in
which after much toil he makes little progress. Certainly not. And again, if he is
forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty
vessel? That is certain. Laboring in vain, he must
end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation? Yes. Then a soul which forgets
cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures; we must insist that the
philosopher should have a good memory? Certainly. And once more, the
inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion? Undoubtedly. And do you consider truth
to be akin to proportion or to disproportion? To proportion. Then, besides other
qualities, we must try to find a naturally well-proportioned and gracious
mind, which will move spontaneously toward the true being of everything. Certainly. Well, and do not all these
qualities, which we have been enumerating, go together, and are they not, in
a manner, necessary to a soul, which is to have a full and perfect
participation of being? They are absolutely
necessary, he replied. And must not that be a
blameless study which he only can pursue who has the gift of a good memory,
and is quick to learn--noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice,
courage, temperance, who are his kindred? The god of jealousy
himself, he said, could find no fault with such a study. And to men like him, I
said, when perfected by years and education, and to
these only you will intrust the State.
Source: Plato. The Republic. |