As we see that every state
is a society, and that every society is established for the
sake of some good end; (for an apparent good is the spring
of all human actions;) it is evident that all societies aim
at some good or another: and this is more especially true of
that which aims at the highest possible end, and is itself
the most excellent, and embraces all the rest. Now this is
that which is called a state, and forms a political society.
For those who are greatly at fault, who think that the
principles of a political, a regal, a domestic, and a
despotic government are the same; inasmuch as they suppose
that each of these differ merely in point of number, and not
in kind: so that with them, a despotic government is one
composed of a very few, a domestic of more, a civil and
regal of still more, as if there were no difference between
a large family and a small city; and they hold that a regal
and political government are the same things; only that in
the one, a single person is continually at the head of
affairs, while in the other, each individual in his turn
becomes a magistrate and again a private person, according
to the rules of political science. Now this is not true; and
what we say will be evident to anyone who will consider this
question after the approved method. For as, in every other
subject, it is necessary to separate its component nature,
till we arrive at its first elements, which are the most
minute parts thereof; so by viewing the first elements of
which a state is composed, we shall see wherein states
differ from each other, and whether it is possible to arrive
at any systematic knowledge concerning each of the points
above mentioned.
Now if any one would watch the parts of a state from the
very first as they rise into existence, as in other matters,
so here he would gain the truest view of the subject. In the
first place, then, it is requisite that those should be
joined together, which cannot exist without each other, as
the male and the female, for the business of propagation;
and this not through deliberate choice, but by that natural
impulse which acts both in plants and in animals, namely,
the desire of leaving behind them others like themselves. By
nature too some beings command, and others obey, for the
sake of mutual safety; for a being endowed with discernment
and forethought is by nature the superior and governor;
whereas he who is merely able to execute by bodily labour,
is the inferior and a natural slave; and hence the interest
of master and slave is identical. But there is a natural
difference between the female and the slave; for nature does
nothing meanly, like artists who make the Delphic swords;
but she has one instrument for one end; for thus her
instruments are most likely to be brought to perfection,
being made to contribute to one end, and not to many. Yet,
among Barbarians, the female and the slave are upon a level
in the community; the reason for which is, that they are not
fitted by nature to rule; and so their relationship becomes
merely that between slaves of different sexes. For which
reason the poets say, "?Tis meet that barbarous tribes to
Greeks should bow," as if a barbarian and a slave were by
nature one and the same. Now of these two societies the
domestic tie is the first, and Hesiod is right when he says,
"First house, then wife, then oxen for the plough"; for the
ox is to the poor man in the place of a household slave.
That society, then, which nature has established for daily
support, is a family, and those who compose it are called by
Charondas "feeding at the same manger," and by Epimendes
that Cretan "using the same hearth." But the society of many
families, which was instituted for lasting and mutual
advantage, is called a village, and a village is most
naturally composed of the emigrant members of one family,
whom some persons call "...", the children and the
children's children. And hence, by the way, states were
originally governed by kings, as the Barbarians now are; for
they were composed of those who were always under kingly
government. . . . But when many villages join themselves
perfectly together into one society, that society is a
state, and contains in itself, if I may so speak, the
perfection of independence; and it is first founded that men
may live, but continued that they may live happily. For
which reason every state is the work of nature, since the
first social ties are such; for to this they all tend as to
an end, and the nature of a thing is judged by this
tendency. For what every being is in its perfect state, that
certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man,
a horse, or a house; besides, its own final cause and its
end must be the perfection of anything; but a government
complete in itself constitutes a final cause and what is
best. Hence it is evident, that a state is one of the works
of nature, and that man naturally is a political animal, and
that whosoever is naturally, and not accidentally, unfit for
society, must be either inferior or superior to man; just as
the person reviled in Homer, "No tribe, nor state, nor home
hath he."
...
No one can doubt that the legislator ought greatly to
interest himself in the care of youth; for, where it is
neglected, it is hurtful to the city. For every state ought
to be governed according to its particular nature; for the
character of each government is that which peculiarly marks
it, and as this originally established it, so it usually
preserves it. For instance, a democratic character preserves
a democracy, the oligarchic an oligarchy, but universally
the best character tends to produce the best government.
Besides, as in every business and art there are some things
necessary to the performance of their several works which
men must learn first, and to which they must be accustomed;
so it is evident that the same thing is necessary towards
the practice of virtue. As there is one end in view in every
city, it is evident that education ought to be one and the
same in all; and that this should be a common care, and not
that of each individual, as it now is, when every one takes
care of his own children separately, and each parent in
private teaches them as he pleases, but the training of what
belongs to all ought to be in common. Besides, no one ought
to think that any citizen belongs to him in particular, but
to the state in general; for each one is part of the state,
and it is the natural duty of each part to regard the good
of the whole; and for this the Lacedaemonians may be
praised, for they give the greatest attention to education,
and they make it public. It is evident, then, that laws
should be laid down concerning education, and that it should
be public.
What education is, and how children ought to be
instructed, is what should be well known; for now a days
there are doubts concerning the business of it, as all
people do not agree in those things they would have a child
taught, both with respect to their improvement in virtue,
and a happy life; nor is it clear, whether the object of it
should be to improve the intellect, or to rectify the
morals. The view gained from the present mode of education
is confused, and we cannot determine with certainty whether
it is right to instruct a child in what will be useful to
him in life; or in that which tends to virtue, and is really
excellent; for all these things have their separate
defenders. As to virtue, there is no particular in which
they all agree: for as all do not equally esteem all
virtues, it reasonably follows that they will not cultivate
the same. It is evident, that out of the number of useful
things, what is necessary ought to be taught to all: but
that which is necessary for one is not necessary for all;
for as there ought to be a distinction between the
employment of a freeman and a slave, the freeman should be
taught everything useful, which will not make him who knows
it mean. But every work is to be esteemed mean, and every
art, and every discipline as well, which renders the body,
the mind, or the understanding of freemen unfit for the
habit and practice of virtue. For which reason all those
arts which tend to deform the body are called mean, and all
those employments which are exercised for gain; for they
take off from the leisure of the mind, and render it sordid.
There are also some liberal arts, which are not improper for
freemen to apply in a certain degree; but all sedulous
endeavour to acquire a perfect skill in them, is exposed to
the faults I have just mentioned. For there is a great deal
of difference in the reason for which anyone does or learns
anything: for it is not illiberal to engage in it for the
sake of oneself, or of one's friend, or in the cause of
virtue; while, at the same time, to do it for the sake of
another, may seem to be acting the part of a servant and
slave. The modes of instruction which now prevail, as we
said before, seem to partake of both these parts.
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