Philosophy in the Age of Alexander: Aristotle's Politics
From Aristotle. The Politics and Economics of Aristotle. trans. Edward Walford (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853), 2-7, 270-272.
As we see that every state is a society, and that every society is established for the sake of some good end; (for an apparent good is the spring of all human actions;) it is evident that all societies aim at some good or another: and this is more especially true of that which aims at the highest possible end, and is itself the most excellent, and embraces all the rest. Now this is that which is called a state, and forms a political society. For those who are greatly at fault, who think that the principles of a political, a regal, a domestic, and a despotic government are the same; inasmuch as they suppose that each of these differ merely in point of number, and not in kind: so that with them, a despotic government is one composed of a very few, a domestic of more, a civil and regal of still more, as if there were no difference between a large family and a small city; and they hold that a regal and political government are the same things; only that in the one, a single person is continually at the head of affairs, while in the other, each individual in his turn becomes a magistrate and again a private person, according to the rules of political science. Now this is not true; and what we say will be evident to anyone who will consider this question after the approved method. For as, in every other subject, it is necessary to separate its component nature, till we arrive at its first elements, which are the most minute parts thereof; so by viewing the first elements of which a state is composed, we shall see wherein states differ from each other, and whether it is possible to arrive at any systematic knowledge concerning each of the points above mentioned.

Now if any one would watch the parts of a state from the very first as they rise into existence, as in other matters, so here he would gain the truest view of the subject. In the first place, then, it is requisite that those should be joined together, which cannot exist without each other, as the male and the female, for the business of propagation; and this not through deliberate choice, but by that natural impulse which acts both in plants and in animals, namely, the desire of leaving behind them others like themselves. By nature too some beings command, and others obey, for the sake of mutual safety; for a being endowed with discernment and forethought is by nature the superior and governor; whereas he who is merely able to execute by bodily labour, is the inferior and a natural slave; and hence the interest of master and slave is identical. But there is a natural difference between the female and the slave; for nature does nothing meanly, like artists who make the Delphic swords; but she has one instrument for one end; for thus her instruments are most likely to be brought to perfection, being made to contribute to one end, and not to many. Yet, among Barbarians, the female and the slave are upon a level in the community; the reason for which is, that they are not fitted by nature to rule; and so their relationship becomes merely that between slaves of different sexes. For which reason the poets say, "?Tis meet that barbarous tribes to Greeks should bow," as if a barbarian and a slave were by nature one and the same. Now of these two societies the domestic tie is the first, and Hesiod is right when he says, "First house, then wife, then oxen for the plough"; for the ox is to the poor man in the place of a household slave. That society, then, which nature has established for daily support, is a family, and those who compose it are called by Charondas "feeding at the same manger," and by Epimendes that Cretan "using the same hearth." But the society of many families, which was instituted for lasting and mutual advantage, is called a village, and a village is most naturally composed of the emigrant members of one family, whom some persons call "...", the children and the children's children. And hence, by the way, states were originally governed by kings, as the Barbarians now are; for they were composed of those who were always under kingly government. . . . But when many villages join themselves perfectly together into one society, that society is a state, and contains in itself, if I may so speak, the perfection of independence; and it is first founded that men may live, but continued that they may live happily. For which reason every state is the work of nature, since the first social ties are such; for to this they all tend as to an end, and the nature of a thing is judged by this tendency. For what every being is in its perfect state, that certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house; besides, its own final cause and its end must be the perfection of anything; but a government complete in itself constitutes a final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident, that a state is one of the works of nature, and that man naturally is a political animal, and that whosoever is naturally, and not accidentally, unfit for society, must be either inferior or superior to man; just as the person reviled in Homer, "No tribe, nor state, nor home hath he."

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No one can doubt that the legislator ought greatly to interest himself in the care of youth; for, where it is neglected, it is hurtful to the city. For every state ought to be governed according to its particular nature; for the character of each government is that which peculiarly marks it, and as this originally established it, so it usually preserves it. For instance, a democratic character preserves a democracy, the oligarchic an oligarchy, but universally the best character tends to produce the best government. Besides, as in every business and art there are some things necessary to the performance of their several works which men must learn first, and to which they must be accustomed; so it is evident that the same thing is necessary towards the practice of virtue. As there is one end in view in every city, it is evident that education ought to be one and the same in all; and that this should be a common care, and not that of each individual, as it now is, when every one takes care of his own children separately, and each parent in private teaches them as he pleases, but the training of what belongs to all ought to be in common. Besides, no one ought to think that any citizen belongs to him in particular, but to the state in general; for each one is part of the state, and it is the natural duty of each part to regard the good of the whole; and for this the Lacedaemonians may be praised, for they give the greatest attention to education, and they make it public. It is evident, then, that laws should be laid down concerning education, and that it should be public.

What education is, and how children ought to be instructed, is what should be well known; for now a days there are doubts concerning the business of it, as all people do not agree in those things they would have a child taught, both with respect to their improvement in virtue, and a happy life; nor is it clear, whether the object of it should be to improve the intellect, or to rectify the morals. The view gained from the present mode of education is confused, and we cannot determine with certainty whether it is right to instruct a child in what will be useful to him in life; or in that which tends to virtue, and is really excellent; for all these things have their separate defenders. As to virtue, there is no particular in which they all agree: for as all do not equally esteem all virtues, it reasonably follows that they will not cultivate the same. It is evident, that out of the number of useful things, what is necessary ought to be taught to all: but that which is necessary for one is not necessary for all; for as there ought to be a distinction between the employment of a freeman and a slave, the freeman should be taught everything useful, which will not make him who knows it mean. But every work is to be esteemed mean, and every art, and every discipline as well, which renders the body, the mind, or the understanding of freemen unfit for the habit and practice of virtue. For which reason all those arts which tend to deform the body are called mean, and all those employments which are exercised for gain; for they take off from the leisure of the mind, and render it sordid. There are also some liberal arts, which are not improper for freemen to apply in a certain degree; but all sedulous endeavour to acquire a perfect skill in them, is exposed to the faults I have just mentioned. For there is a great deal of difference in the reason for which anyone does or learns anything: for it is not illiberal to engage in it for the sake of oneself, or of one's friend, or in the cause of virtue; while, at the same time, to do it for the sake of another, may seem to be acting the part of a servant and slave. The modes of instruction which now prevail, as we said before, seem to partake of both these parts.