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Between World Wars Ernest R. May Associate Professor of History Harvard University http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii_2.html After
World War I representatives of the victorious powers met in Paris to
devise a peace settlement that would protect future generations from
another such conflict. All agreed that a new framework or system was
needed in international relations. Each power, however, had different Neither the punitive clauses of the
treaties nor the Covenant worked out quite as their authors had hoped.
Although the Germans complied with most of the restrictions imposed on
them, they recovered rapidly in relative strength. At Rapallo
on April 16, 1922, they signed with the By the latter
part of the 1920's, the guarantees of peace were somewhat different from
those that had been envisioned in 1919. The articles of the Treaty of
Versailles designed to keep Germany in check were supplemented by
defensive alliances between France and certain of BREAKDOWN OF THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM On Sept. 18,
1931, a small bomb exploded underneath a section of track on the South
Manchuria Railroad. The Japanese Army, which under long-standing
agreements policed the railroad, used this incident as a pretext for
launching operations aimed at conquering all of Manchuria for Japan. The
Chinese government, which had nominal sovereignty over the area,
protested to the League of Nations. Some supporters of the principle of
collective security saw an opportunity for the League to prove that it
was capable of stopping an aggressor. The majority of Paying little
attention to the League's advice, the Japanese continued their
operations. When the Chinese organized a boycott of Japanese goods, they
went even further. Reinforcing the garrison which they already
maintained at Shanghai, in January 1932 they seized control of that
city. By May they had been persuaded by League mediators to reach a
truce agreement with the Chinese in Shanghai, from which their forces
were gradually withdrawn. In the meantime, however, they had convened in
Manchuria a rump assembly and had it proclaim the independence of the
region, now to be called Manchukuo, on February 18. The new state, which
came into existence officially on March 1, signed with Japan on
September 15 a treaty making it a virtual ward of that country. The first
Western nation to show umbrage over these events was the United States.
Despite its isolationism it had a long tradition of interest in the Far
East. When the League Council convened to hear the Chinese protests, the
American government sent an official observer to Geneva. The view in Washington at that
time was that Western powers ought not to do anything that might
aggravate the political situation in Tokyo, but Secretary of State Henry
L. Stimson subsequently became convinced that there ought to be some
general assertion of opposition to The sessions
of the League Assembly in the fall and winter of 1932-1933 were devoted
largely to the Manchurian issue. The commission of inquiry, headed by
the 2d earl of Lytton, made its report, stating that while the Japanese
had possessed some grievances their action had been excessive, that the
establishment of an independent Manchukuo had not been in accordance
with the wishes of the people, and that Japanese forces ought to return
the rail lines, restore the status quo ante bellum, and negotiate a new
understanding about Manchuria with the Chinese. After In the
meantime, a severe economic depression had developed. A crash of the New
York stock market in October 1929 had been followed by a rapid decline
in American production, employment, and foreign commerce. The
repercussions were soon felt in all countries that traded with the
United States and also in those where American funds were invested. So
far flung was the network of American commercial and financial
relationships that by 1931 people were speaking of a world depression. It had soon
become clear that most European governments would be unable to continue
making payments on World War I debts. Ever since the early 1920's,
British statesmen had been urging that the United States forgive all or
part of what was owed by her wartime allies, proposing that they in turn
remit some or all of the payments due them from Germany as reparations.
The American government had rejected this proposal, but in 1931, faced
with the depression, President Hoover relented and arranged for a
one-year moratorium on both debt and reparation payments. Seeking
reelection in 1932, he dared not repeat the experiment. Some of the
debtor states were forced to default. In the end all but Finland did so,
and the result was not only to embarrass the governments involved but
also to strengthen isolationist feeling in the United States. Eventually
almost all the affected states sought solutions for their economic
problems in independent, nationalistic action. Seeking a commercial and
financial advantage over other countries, the British abandoned the gold
standard and devalued the pound in 1931. Through By far the
most ominous event of these depression years was the emergence of Hitler
in Germany. A psychopathic personality, he rejected all conventional
moral standards. In his book Mein Kampf (2 vols., 1925-1927) and
in later speeches he had disclosed his abhorrence of such The other
nations of Europe viewed him with alarm but also with uncertainty. Few
could believe that he really meant what he said, or that once in office
he would not become more restrained, more conventional, and more
prudent. At first his actions justified this opinion. While he carried
out the domestic programs he had advocated, succeeding soon in
abolishing all but the forms of democracy and constituting himself
fuhrer (leader) of the German people, externally he Until the
summer of 1934 the only actions of Hitler that excited international
apprehension were those concerning armaments. As part of the campaign to
revive the German economy, he undertook to increase production by heavy
industry, particularly those branches that would The first
strong indication that this might be the case came in July 1934 in
Austria. That country had a National Socialist Party modeled on Hitler's
and more or less openly supported by German officials. In the spring of
1934, the party increased its agitation. Then, when Chancellor The French
became increasingly apprehensive as evidence accumulated to indicate
that Hitler planned much more formidable forces than those of which he
had spoken in October and November 1933. On March 10, 1935, one of his
officials disclosed that the projected German Air Force would be larger
than the French. Six days later, Hitler himself proclaimed the
reinstitution of compulsory military service. To cope with
the prospective peril, the French had begun to mature a strategy.
Foreign Minister Louis Barthou summarized it as an effort " to
group the European interests that could be menaced by the rapid revival
of Germany. Although Barthou was assassinated at Marseille on Oct. 9,
1934, in company with King Alexander I of Yugoslavia, his policy was
carried on (albeit somewhat irresolutely) by his successor, Pierre
Laval. To begin with, in January 1935, Laval held formal conversations
with Mussolini, seeking a common Franco-Italian front. These
conversations were welcomed by the Italian dictator. Soon after the
emergence of Hitler he had proposed that Italy, France, Great Britain,
and Germany agree to procedures by which they alone, bypassing the Mussolini's
principal aim was to circumvent the provisions of the League Covenant
that might give protection to Ethiopia, for he had been trying
unsuccessfully since the early 1920's to make that nation an economic
colony of Italy, and at some point before 1933 he had decided to attempt
its forcible conquest. He feared that, since Ethiopia had been admitted
to the League in 1923, it might be able to win that body's support, but
he recognized that if the British and French did not join in collective
resolutions and sanctions, these would be ineffectual. A clash between The formal
convention signed by Laval and Mussolini on Jan. 7, 1935, said nothing
about Ethiopia: it merely resolved certain issues with regard to French
and Italian colonies already existing in Africa. Mussolini declared
later, however, that Laval had given him verbal assurance of a free hand
in Ethiopia, and Laval himself admitted that he had promised not to
interfere with Italian economic penetration there. The Frenchman
professed not to have made any commitment with regard to political or
military penetration, but what was said and left unsaid gave Mussolini
warrant for interpreting the conversations as he did, and he accelerated
preparations for war, apparently much less concerned now about
interference by the League. Laval had
gotten what he had sought. Another convention, signed on the same day,
affirmed that France and Italy would jointly keep watch on events in
Austria and confer about common action if that nation were imperiled,
and it was agreed that Mussolini should invite the British to Meanwhile,
Laval began negotiations with the ambassador of the USSR in Paris. On
May 2, they announced the signature of a five-year pact pledging mutual
assistance in the event that either nation was the victim of aggression.
This was followed on May 16 by a similar pact between the Soviet Union
and Czechoslovakia. Coupled with the earlier treaties that allied Poland
and the Little Entente with France, these accords seemed to close the
ring around Nazi Germany, and they were The so-called
Stresa front was short lived. Some members of the British government
reacted to the evidence of German rearmament by drawing the moral that
the nation should detach itself and avoid such enforced involvement in
war as that of 1914. Finding the German government full Nor did the
Franco-Soviet accord prove more durable. Laval had always doubted the
wisdom of the Barthou policy and inclined toward the view that France
might be better off in league with Germany than against her. On Jan. 13,
1935, the plebiscite promised by the Treaty of Versailles had taken
place in the Saar, with more than 90 percent of the voters opting for
reunion with Germany, and Laval not only accepted the verdict with good
cheer but made the point to diplomats that France would not necessarily
be intransigent in all matters that affected Germany. Instead of seeking prompt ratification
of the Franco-Soviet Pact by the French Parliament, he held it over (it
was carried through that body by his successor, Albert Sarraut, in
February 1936), meanwhile evading all suggestions from the Soviet
capital of a military convention to supplement it and to make clear how
it might be carried out. The Soviets were pressing Laval onto delicate
ground, it is true, for a military convention would involve such issues
as whether or not Soviet troops could move across Poland or Romania, and
Laval, who had become premier on June 7, 1935, was looking forward
uneasily to a national election and to the possibility that the
opposition Popular Front, of which the Communists were part, might
profit from a closer Franco-Soviet tie. Nevertheless, his hesitancies provided
further evidence that the unity of Europe against Germany might be an
illusion. Although the
British at Stresa had given Mussolini no assurances that they would
acquiesce in his conquest of Ethiopia, their reticences had been so
interpreted by him, and he was strengthened in this view when, in June
1935, Anthony Eden, minister for League of Nations affairs, came to Rome
to suggest that Britain might cede to Ethiopia part of British
Somaliland so that Ethiopia might in turn appease Italy by ceding to it
some land adjacent to Italian Somaliland. Eden even suggested that a way
might be found to make Ethiopia a virtual economic protectorate of In Geneva the
League Council, immediately heard the protests of Haile Selassie's
representative. On October 7, with Italy alone abstaining, it voted to
condemn Mussolini's aggression as a resort to war in defiance of Article
12 of the Covenant. Referred to the Assembly, this resolution on October
11 won the support of 50 of the 54 members, only Italy and her client
states, Albania, Austria, and Hungary, opposing it. It remained for a
Coordination Committee of the League to determine what sanctions should
be imposed. Here practical rather than moral issues Fearing that
closure of the canal would lead to war with Italy, the British
government, which controlled the waterway, had little inclination to
take that step. As for oil, it was doubtful whether a League decree
could be effective in view of the fact that the leading producer, the
United States, was not bound by the Covenant. Although Congress had
enacted a so-called Neutrality Act (signed on Aug. 31, 1935), which
required embargoes to be laid on exports of munitions to When the
Coordination Committee brought in its report on October 19, it made only
five relatively mild recommendations for sanctions against Italy:
embargoes on shipments of arms to her; bans on loans and credits; bans
on imports from her; embargoes on exports to her of transport As Italian
military operations continued, sentiment grew, especially in Britain,
for more effective action. Between January and June 1935, a so-called
Peace Ballot, a national referendum supported by the British League of
Nations Union and allied groups, had yielded 6,784,368 votes Those
ministers who were dubious about the whole policy of sanctions found
this pressure especially onerous. They urged a further effort to induce
Mussolini to abandon the war and thus, they hoped, to rescue Britain
from the predicament in which she was likely soon to find herself.
Precisely what was said and agreed on within the cabinet remains
unknown. The result was, however, that Hoare set off in early December
for a skating holiday in Switzerland, and that he paused for two days
(December 7-8) in Paris for intensive conversations with Laval. The
result of these conversations was an agreement on proposals to be made
secretly to Mussolini. He was to be asked to halt the war with the
understanding that Italy would receive from Ethiopia the northeastern Convinced
that the application of further sanctions would lead to a general war
harmful to French interests, Laval had devised these terms. He had also
developed the strategy to be followed. The plan was to be put before
Mussolini first. After he accepted, it was to be shown to Haile Selassie.
When the Ethiopian ruler rejected it, the French and British would be
able to say that he had refused peace, and could not only oppose the
imposition of further sanctions but also call for the lifting of those
that had already been voted. Whatever the outcome for Ethiopia, the
crisis between the League powers and Italy would have been bridged, and
some facsimile of the Stresa front might be put together again. Even
before they could be put into diplomatic cables, however, Mussolini had
meanwhile given indication that he would not in any case accept less
than the total conquest of Ethiopia. In January 1936, there was
discussion within the League of adding an oil embargo to the sanctions.
Despite the events that had followed the release of the Hoare-Laval
terms, however, official French and British opinion was still opposed to
such action. The decision was for delay, pending the outcome of
Roosevelt's efforts to amend the American neutrality laws. Since nothing encouraging was done by
Congress, nothing at all was done by the League. As it turned out, the
limit of its capacities had been reached in the vote of sanctions of
October. As winter turned into spring, the Italian offensive in Ethiopia
gained momentum. On May 5, 1936, Fascist troops marched into the
capital, Addis Ababa. Four days later, Mussolini proclaimed the war
ended and Ethiopia part of Italian East Africa. By summer most of the
League powers had concluded that they could only accept as a fact the
extinction of Ethiopian sovereignty, and the Assembly agreed that
sanctions against Italy should be suspended as of July 15. The League's
machinery for maintaining collective security had proved ineffectual. An even more
significant demonstration of this fact came before the Italo-Ethiopian
War was liquidated. Seeing the split within the Stresa front, Hitler
decided to act in the Rhineland--to repudiate the articles of the Treaty
of Versailles that declared that region permanently demilitarized. When
he communicated this decision to his generals, they were appalled. In
their view the German Army was still comparatively weak, and the air
force had relatively little offensive capability. They warned the fuhrer
that the French had the power single-handedly to drive a German force from the region and
impose humiliating terms. Hitler's response was a simple assertion that
the French would not move. He ordered the requisite preparations made. The legal
pretext he found in the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. By committing France
to act against Germany in the event of German aggression against the
USSR, Hitler could argue, this pact constituted a repudiation of the
Locarno treaties, in which France had promised never to make war on
Germany except in obedience to resolutions by the League of Nations. It
also constituted a threat to Germany, he could say, and therefore,
despite the Treaty of Versailles, gave warrant for action in
self-defense. On March 7, 1936, shortly after the French Assembly's
ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact, he exposed this reasoning in
diplomatic notes and in a speech to the Reichstag. He announced that
German troops were moving into the demilitarized zone. At the same time,
The French
government was shocked. Premier Sarraut responded with a forceful radio
address, declaring, "We shall not leave Strasbourg under the German
cannon. As he later testified, however, he and his colleagues were
uncertain as to what they would in fact do. Reports by military men on
France's capacity to repel the German force were generally pessimistic.
The army, they said, was inadequate. It would be necessary to call up
reservists in order to fill its ranks. Overestimating the German bomber
force, they warned that Paris and other centers lacked the One capital
with which they were particularly concerned was Warsaw. On the day of
Hitler's announcement the Polish government gave them reassurance that
in the event of a clash it would stand by the alliance of 1921 and
proposed immediate conversations. Two days later, on March 9, however,
it declared that it accepted the German thesis and regarded the
reoccupation of the Rhineland as a legitimate response to the
Franco-Soviet Pact. Their objective may have been merely to emphasize
that Polish support of France would constitute action above and beyond The French
government was thus informed by its two most important allies that it
could not expect backing if it replied to the Germans with force. Some
members of the Sarraut cabinet found this news not unwelcome. Perhaps
most did, for they faced a general election in May; they felt that a
call-up of reservists would cost them votes; and, in view of the
identification of their Popular Front opponents with antifascism, they
feared that any crisis with Germany might have the same effect. The
French press, also preoccupied with domestic affairs, raised little
clamor for action. Consequently, on March 11, Sarraut backed away from
his earlier position, announcing that the cabinet had decided to seek a
solution within the framework of the League of Nations, working in
conjunction with the othr signers of the Locarno Pact. The League did in
fact discuss a resolution condemning the German action. Nothing came of
this discussion, however, and the Rhineland END OF THE LONG ARMISTICE Hardly were
the Ethiopian and Rhineland crises out of mind when a new storm swept
the stage. In Spanish Morocco on July 17, 1936, so-called Nationalists
launched a revolution against the Popular Front government of the
five-year old Spanish Republic (garrisons in Spain proper rose Italy and
Germany both agreed promptly to act. Italian ships and planes were soon
aiding Nationalist troops to cross from Morocco to the Iberian
Peninsula, and before long Italians and Germans were actually fighting
in the Nationalist ranks. On November 28, Mussolini signed with the
Nationalist leader, Gen. Francisco Franco, a pact providing that Italian
aid should be recompensed by economic cooperation, political cooperation
in the western Mediterranean, and "benevolent neutrality on the
part of Spain in a general war. Later, on March 20, 1937, Hitler entered
into an agreement with Franco that promised consultations in the event
of a European war and guaranteed the export to Germany of quantities of
Spanish provisions and raw materials. At first the
French government was disposed to give aid to the republicans, and,
indeed, Premier Blum immediately authorized sales of aircraft and
munitions. But counsels of caution soon came to the fore. With little of
the regular army loyal to it, the Spanish Republic seemed unlikely to
survive. Since the Spanish Popular Front was somewhat more radical than
the French, its cabinet was viewed askance by some members of the Blum
government. Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned
furthermore that assistance to the republicans would probably lead to
increased Italian and German assistance to the Nationalists, and that
the eventual outcome might well be a general European war. This last
consideration was pressed on the French by their British allies. Many in
the majority Conservative Party felt that Britain's position should be
"a plague o' both your houses. While most Liberals and Labourites
praised the republic and damned the Nationalists, few argued that
British interests were involved in the civil war. The Baldwin cabinet
therefore had mass support in adopting the position that the aim of the
democracies should be to quarantine Spain and prevent the conflict from
spreading. Torn within
and under pressure from London, the Blum cabinet decided to take a
similar stand. On Aug. 1, 1936, it proclaimed a policy of
nonintervention, declaring that the Spaniards should be allowed to fight
out their war without aid in men or materiel from any other country and The Spanish
conflict was not the match that touched off a new world war. It did,
however, make tensions more acute. Even among those in Britain, France,
and the United States who continued to regard nonintervention as a wise
policy there were some who felt that Spain represented one more victory
for the totalitarian states, and that this fact brought nearer the
moment when their career of success would have to be checked. Among the
Italians and Germans it strengthened the illusion that the democracies
were weak willed and would not resist. As the
Spanish Civil War rounded out its first year, a crisis arose in another
part of the globe. Ever since they had created the satellite state of
Manchukuo, the Japanese had been discussing further steps toward
national expansion. Moderate factions had advocated the use of On April 18,
1934, the official spokesman for the Foreign Office, Eiji Amau,
announced that any effort by a Western power to aid China would be
opposed by Japan. In effect, this declaration was a Japanese Monroe
Doctrine for eastern Asia. In December, Japan gave notice that she would
no longer be bound by the Washington Naval (Five-Power) Treaty of 1922,
which had stipulated that Japanese tonnage in capital ships should not
exceed three-fifths that of Britain or the United States. After
attempting unsuccessfully in 1935 to arrange for the secession of the
northern provinces of China and the establishment there of another
satellite state, the Japanese government on Aug. 11, 1936, devised a new
statement of "fundamental principles of a national policy,
declaring Japan's destiny to be the dominating force in all of eastern
Asia. Most of the
powers with interests in the Far East failed to respond with any vigor.
The United States contented itself with mild diplomatic protests, and
while the British spoke of extending help to China, they made no move to
do so. Only the Soviet Union acted in such a way as to indicate that it
might at some point resist a Japanese advance. On March 12, 1936, it
signed a mutual defense pact with its client state, Outer Mongolia
(Mongolian People's Republic). More important, Soviet dictator Joseph
STALIN advised the Chinese Communists to make peace with the central
government and form a common front. Faced with these gestures by the
USSR, the Japanese government seized on a proposal from the Germans and
on November 25 signed with Hitler an Anti-Comintern Pact. This
agreement stipulated nothing more than that the two governments exchange
data about, and collaborate in suppressing, Communist activities.
Inevitably, however, other governments suspected that it contained
secret articles making the two nations allies. The result in both London
and Washington was to quicken apprehension concerning possible Japanese
aggressive moves. In April 1937, the British government began belatedly Rising
prospects for foreign support of China, coupled with various domestic
developments, led the Japanese government to decide that it could no
longer achieve its objects by peaceful means. On July 7, 1937, taking
advantage of a minor clash at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peiping The Japanese
were able in 18 months to overrun the area around Peiping, the central
Yangtze Basin, and most of the coast of southern China. By the end of
1938 they controlled the richest portions of the country and exercised
sway over nearly half its population. In uneasy cooperation with the
Communists the Chinese central government was organizing itself for
prolonged resistance, and, in fact, war was to continue for more than
eight years. Nevertheless, the Japanese aggression seemed at the time to
have been an overwhelming success. And in view of the Even before
the Sino-Japanese War the French and British had begun to take some
action. Military authorities in both countries estimated (probably
erroneously) that the Germans had a long lead in preparations for war.
To bring themselves abreast the French decided in October 1936 They were not
yet formal allies. Indeed, from the French and British standpoint, it
seemed that they were far from being so. After the settlement of the
Ethiopian affair, Italy's paramount interests appeared once again to lie
in the Danubian region. And it was there that Hitler seemed most likely
to make his next move. He had continued to give strong backing to the
Austrian Nazis. In February 1938, through pressure on Chancellor von
Schuschnigg, he forced the appointment of Nazis to key posts in the
Austrian government. He and they talked openly of an Anschluss: a
political union. It remained to be seen whether Mussolini would react
again as he had in 1934. The Italian dictator did in fact sound out the
British government on the possibility of an accord. He did Meanwhile,
Hitler moved. On Nov. 5, 1937, he had disclosed his thoughts to some of
his principal political and military subordinates. The next six to eight
years, he said, would bring Germany to the peak of her relative power.
Thereafter rearmament by other nations, coupled with the obsolescence of
German weapons, would mean that any change would be for the worse.
" Germany's problem could only be solved by means of force, he
declared, and "it was his unalterable resolve to solve Germany's
problem of space at the latest by 1943-1945. The first steps would be
the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. After that the schedule
would depend on circumstances. Morally sure that Italy would not resist,
he had made preparations to act against Austria. His demand for the
installation of Nazis in key posts in that government was a first step. When Schuschnigg made a sign of
defiance, announcing a projected plebiscite in which the Austrian people
would register their desire to remain independent, Hitler sent an angry
ultimatum demanding its cancellation. Encouraged by Schuschnigg's
compliance, he then demanded that a Nazi be installed as chancellor.
When rebuffed, he directed Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Austrian Nazi
minister of the interior, to proclaim himself head of a provisional
government and invite German It was clear
to all the world that Czechoslovakia was now in peril. German garrisons
ringed its western frontiers, and the German press and radio thundered
about persecution suffered by the German minority there. In the
Sudetenland, where most of this minority resided, a constant Although this
episode was frequently cited later as an instance in which firmness by
the other powers had forced Hitler to back down, the fact was that the
crisis was illusory. While the fuhrer intended eventually to move
against Czechoslovakia, it had not been in his mind to act so In succeeding
weeks and months the British showed an increasing disposition to arrange
some appeasement of the Germans. Neville CHAMBERLAIN was now prime
minister, having succeeded Baldwin on May 28, 1937, and he was strongly
of the view that the Germans had many Berchtesgaden and Bad Godesberg To avert the
impending crisis, Chamberlain resolved to meet face to face with Hitler.
Although he was 69 years old and had never been in an airplane before,
he telegraphed the German dictator offering to fly over at once, and on
September 15, Hitler met him at Berchtesgaden. There the prime minister
asked if Germany would be satisfied by the cession to her of the
Sudetenland. When assured that this was the case, he promised to press
such a solution on the French and the Czechs. He returned to London sure
that a basis for peace had been found and convinced, too, as The initial
response from Prague was negative. The government of President Eduard
Benes was well aware that in sacrificing the Sudetenland Czechoslovakia
would lose not only valuable resources and industrial plants but also
her only natural defenses against Germany, and Benes had thus far
employed every device to prevent its loss. But this initial response was
not the final one. Fearful as they were of the Germans, Czech leaders
were even more frightened of the Russians. Further dispatches from London and
Paris impressed on them the fact that even if the Western democracies
went to war in their behalf, British and French troops would not come to
Czechoslovakia. Soviet troops, on the other hand, might do so. There
were persistent hints from Moscow that they would force their way
through Romania or Poland. The general feeling among Czech leaders was
that, if so, they would never withdraw. The cabinet, or at least some
part of it, decided that the course of wisdom was to accept the
sacrifices urged by the British and French. Declaring that he was acting with the
knowledge of Benes, Premier Milan Hodza communicated secretly with
Bonnet, requesting a statement that France would not defend
Czechoslovakia if the Anglo-French proposals were rejected. With this in
hand, he indicated, it would be possible for the cabinet to justify
acceptance of them. Bonnet complied, and on September 21 the Czechs gave
notice that they would agree to the terms which Chamberlain and Hitler
had devised at Berchtesgaden. Delighted,
Chamberlain arranged for another meeting with the fuhrer, this time at
Bad Godesberg on the Rhine. When he arrived on September 22, however, he
found to his dismay that the Berchtesgaden terms no longer satisfied
Hitler. The German now demanded not only that the For the next
few days, Europe seemed on the verge of war. The Czechs mobilized.
Daladier and Bonnet came again to London, where they were assured more
or less definitively of British support. They in turn promised backing
to the Czechs. On September 26, Hitler spoke at the While the
German leader had hoped that France would not act and had counted on the
British not to do so, he told intimates that he was ready to make war if
it proved necessary. His generals were almost unanimous in holding that
Germany was not in fact ready to fight against The
conference met at Munich on September 29-30. A new plan was put forward
by Mussolini. Since it had actually been drawn up in Berlin, Hitler said
that he found it a satisfactory basis for negotiation. Chamberlain and
Daladier accepted it with few amendments. The four Hitler, of
course, was not satisfied with the Munich settlement. On October 21,
only three weeks after signing the accord, he advised his generals that
one of their next tasks would be "liquidation of the remainder of
Czechoslovakia. Another was the seizure of Memel, a port on In western
European capitals, even while joy over Munich was at its height, there
was some suspicion about Hitler's future intentions. Daladier was
skeptical from the outset that the settlement would last. Reports from
intelligence sources soon aroused similar doubts in members of the
British government. Official and public opinion in both countries veered
toward the view that appeasement had been given its final trial--that
the Munich accords were the last concessions that could be made, and
that further demands by Hitler would call for forthright opposition. In
March 1939, this changed mood was put to the test. Hitler had paid no
attention to diplomats' warnings of it. The French had signed with him
on Dec. 6, 1938, a joint declaration guaranteeing the Franco-German
frontier and promising the settlement of future differences by
consultation. The British had made overtures for economic accords.
Though meant as earnests of desire to make the Munich settlement work,
these gestures were interpreted by Hitler as further evidence of
spinelessness, and when he next acted, he did so more brazenly than on
any occasion in the past. Having given
encouragement earlier to Slovakian separatists, on March 11, 1939, he
sent Austrian Nazis to Slovakia to order the Slovakians to proclaim
their independence and ask him to become their protector. In the
meantime, the Czech president, Emil Hacha, asked to see the fuhrer. The reactions
in Western capitals were mixed. The fact that Hacha had invited German
intervention made it hard for the French and the British to do more than
protest the violation of the spirit of Munich. On the other hand, even
the firmest believers in appeasement were shocked by The nation
most likely to be Hitler's next target was Poland. On January 9, Hitler
had renewed his demands with regard to Danzig, coupling with them a
secret communication suggesting that Poland might in return obtain
eventual cessions of territory in the Soviet Ukraine. On February 1, the
Poles refused. On March 21, however, Hitler notified them in threatening
language that the Danzig issue would have to be settled. Two days later,
German troops seized Memel. The French and British had already indicated
that they were prepared to negotiate an alliance with Poland. The chief
stumbling block was the question of whether or not the On April 7,
Mussolini, imitating Hitler's tactics, invaded Albania. The British and
French governments on April 13 extended their guarantee to Greece and
Romania. Abandoning their earlier policies altogether, they now stood
ready to go to war automatically if the dictators committed new acts of
aggression. The Western
powers were still desirous of having the USSR on their side. All hope of
attaching Italy to their cause had disappeared. On January 4, Mussolini
had told Hitler that he was ready to negotiate a comprehensive alliance.
Although this so-called Pact of Steel, pledging Despite
Polish opposition, the French and British had continued to discuss a
pact with the Soviets. On April 15, the French suggested that the two
Western powers and the USSR sign a treaty containing pledges of mutual
assistance in the event of war. Thus, while the Soviets would not In the
meantime, other negotiations had been in progress between the Soviets
and the Germans. After giving various subtle indications that Munich had
undermined his hope of cooperation with the Western powers, Stalin on
March 10 made a speech summarizing the principles of his foreign policy
as: (1) To continue to pursue a policy of peace and consolidation of
economic relations with all countries. (2) Not to let our country be
drawn into conflict by warmongers, whose custom it is to let others pull
their chestnuts out of the fire. On May 3, Litvinov was replaced by
Vyacheslav M. Molotov, a man who had had no part in the effort to win
alliances with the democracies. Speaking with the German ambassador on
May 20, the new foreign commissar remarked that mutually profitable
economic agreements might be reached if a suitable " Although
Hitler understood these hints, he was slow to act on them. Not until
late in May did he authorize exploratory conversations about a trade
pact and related matters. After these went on for some weeks without
result, on June 29 he abruptly ordered that they be broken off. On July
18, he learned of Russian proposals for resumption of the talks. Eight
days later, his foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, spent an
evening sounding out some Russian officials who were in Berlin.
Encouraged by the results of these and other conversations, Hitler
decided on a bold gamble. On August 14, he had Ribbentrop propose to the
Russians "a speedy clarification of German-Russian relations in due
course clarifying jointly territorial questions in Eastern Europe. Now
the supplicated rather than the suppliants, the Soviets raised a number
of practical issues. In each instance, Hitler responded satisfactorily.
By August 20, terms had been agreed on, and on August 23, Molotov and
Ribbentrop signed a nonaggression pact in Moscow. The published text Thus was a
temporary diplomatic revolution effected. The Nazi and Soviet
dictatorships became allies. Among the great powers only the British and
French remained as potentially active opponents of German expansion.
After the signature of the pact with the USSR, Hitler reportedly On April 3,
Hitler had directed his generals to prepare a plan of campaign against
Poland, with September 1 as its probable starting date. On May 23, in a
conference with top-ranking officers, he disclosed that his intention
was to use the Danzig question as a pretext and "to attack His chosen
pretext had been alleged grievances of the German population in Danzig.
Clamor there for annexation by Germany and for establishment of road and
rail corridors had been augmented since July as a result of the dispatch
to the city of several hundred Nazi agents provocateurs. Citing the
evidence of this agitation, Hitler addressed to Chamberlain a long
appeal for understanding and sympathy. Obviously hoping against hope
that a peaceful solution would emerge, the British prime minister
pressed the Poles to make every concession. They agreed reluctantly to
negotiate about the issues Hitler raised. When their ambassador in
Berlin gave notice to this effect, however, Hitler refused to deal with
him unless he had full powers to reach a settlement on the spot.
Exploiting this pretext, he declared to the British and French
governments that it was not he but the Poles who were rejecting
diplomacy. When the government in Warsaw ordered mobilization on August
30, the German press and radio cried that it was planning an attack. On
the following day, there occurred a small incident on the German side of
the Polish frontier. According to Hitler's subsequent speech, Polish
soldiers attacked a German radio station at Gleiwitz (now Gliwice).
Actually the attackers were Germans outfitted in Polish uniforms, Hitler had
already given the final directive for the invasion to begin at dawn on
September 1. It was well under way before he delivered a radio address
throwing all blame on the Poles and saying that he had had to meet force
with force. When the French and British demanded that he
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