VOLUME III
PART 1, CHAPTER II
On the 10th of June, Napoleon started from Dresden, where he
had been for three weeks the center of a court composed of
princes, dukes, kings, and at least one emperor.
Before his departure, Napoleon showed his favor to the princes,
kings, and the emperor, who deserved it: he turned a cold shoulder
on the kings and princes who had incurred his displeasure; he gave
the Empress of Austria pearls and diamonds, which he called his
own, though they had been stolen from other kings, and then
tenderly embracing the Empress Maria Louisa, as the
historian terms her, left her heart-broken by his absence, which
it seemed to her, now that she considered herself his consort,
although he had another consort left behind in Paris was too hard
to be endured.
Although the diplomats stoutly maintained their belief in the
possibility of peace, and were working heartily for this end;
although Napoleon himself wrote a letter to the Emperor Alexander,
calling him Monsieur, mon Frère, and sincerely assuring
him that he had no desire for war, and that he should always love
and respect him; --still, he was off for the army, and at every
station was issuing new rescripts having in view to expedite the
movement of the troops from west to east.
He traveled in a calash drawn by six horses and accompanied by
his pages, aides, and an escort, and took the route through Posen,
Thorn, Dantzic, and Königsberg.1 The
army was moving from the west to the east, and relays of fresh
horses bore him in the same direction. On the 22d of June, he
overtook the army, and spent the night in the Wilkowisky forest,
on the estate of a Polish count, where quarters had been made
ready for him.
On the following day Napoleon, outstripping the army, drove to
the Niemen2 in his calash; and, for
the purpose of reconnoitering the spot where the army was to
cross, he put on a Polish uniform, and went down to the banks of
the river.
When he saw on the other side the Cossacks, and the
wide-stretching steppes, in the center of which was Moscou, la
ville sainte, the capital of that empire, which reminded him
of the Scythian one, against which Alexander of Macedon had
marched, Napoleon, unexpectedly and contrary to all strategical as
well as diplomatic considerations, gave orders for the advance,
and on the next day the troops began to cross the Nieman.
Early on the morning of the twenty-fourth, he emerged from his
tent, which had been pitched on the steep left bank of the river,
and looked through his field-glass at the torrents of his troops
pouring forth from the Wilkowisky forest, and streaming across the
three bridges thrown over the Niemen.
The troops were aware of the presence of the emperor; they
searched for him with their eyes, and when they discovered him on
the cliff, standing in front of his tent, and distinguished from
his suite by his figure, in an overcoat and cocked hat, they flung
their caps in the air, and shouted, “Vive l’empereur!”
and then, rank after rank, a never-ceasing stream, they poured
forth and still poured forth from the mighty forest that till now
had concealed them, and, dividing into three currents, crossed
over the bridges to the other side.
“Something’ll be done this time! Oh, when he takes a hand,
he makes things hot!--God—save us.—There he is! Hurrah for the
emperor!”
“So these are the Steppes of Asia? Beastly country all the
same!”
“Good-by! Beauché, I’ll save the best palace in Moscow for
you. Good-by! Luck to you!”
“Have you seen him? The emperor? --Hurrah for the emperor—ror—ror!”
“If I am made Governor of India, Gérard, I’ll appoint you
minister at Cashmir; that’s a settled thing.”
“Hurrah for the emperor! Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah!”
“Those rascally Cossacks! How they run! Hurrah for the
emperor!”
“There he is! Do you see him? Twice I’ve seen him as plain
as I see you, --the ‘Little Corporal!’”
“I saw him give the cross to one of our vets. –Hurrah for
the emperor!”
Such were the remarks and shouts made by men, both young and
old, of the most widely differing characters and positions in the
world. The faces of all these men bore one universal expression of
delight at the beginning of the long expected campaign, and of
enthusiasm and devotion for the man in the gray overcoat, standing
on the hill.
* * *
VOLUME IV
PART 3, CHAPTER V
In contradistinction to Kutuzof, though at the same time, and
in an event of far greater importance than the retreat of the army
without fighting, --namely, in the abandonment and the burning of
Moscow, --Rostopchin, who has been considered the responsible
agent for this action, behaved in an entirely different manner.
This event--the abandonment of Moscow and its destruction by
fire--was just exactly, after the battle of Borodino, as
inevitable as the retirement of the troops beyond Moscow,
--without fighting.
Every man in Russia might have predicted what took place, not
indeed by basing his deductions on logic, but by basing them on
that sentiment which is inherent in ourselves and was inherent in
our forefathers.
What happened in Moscow likewise happened--and that too without
Count Rostopchin’s proclamations--in all the cities and villages
of the Russian land, beginning with Smolensk. The nation
unconcernedly awaited the arrival of the foe, displaying no
disorder, no excitement, tearing no one in pieces, but calmly
awaiting their fate, conscious that, even at the most trying
moment, they should find they had the power to do whatever was
required of them. And as soon as the foe approached, the more
wealthy elements of the population departed, leaving their
possessions behind them; the poorer classes stayed, and burned and
destroyed what was abandoned.
The conviction that things must be as they are has always been
and still is inherent in the Russian mind. And this
conviction--nay, more, the presentiment that Moscow would be
taken--pervaded Russian and Muscovite society in the year 1812.
Those who started to abandon Moscow as early as July and the
beginning of August showed that this was what they expected. Those
who fled, taking with them whatever possessions, acted thus in
obedience to that latent patriotism which is expressed not in
phrases, or in the slaughter of children for the salvation of the
fatherland, and by other unnatural deeds, but is expressed
imperceptibly, simply, organically, and accordingly, always
produces the most powerful results.
“It is disgraceful to flee from danger; only cowards will fly
from Moscow,” it was said to them. Rostopchin, in his Afishki,
declared that it was ignominious to leave Moscow. They were
ashamed to be branded as cowards, they were ashamed to go; but
still they went, because they knew that it had to be so.
What made them go?
It is impossible to suppose that Rostopchin frightened them by
his cock-and-bull stories of the atrocities committed by Napoleon
in conquered lands. They fled, and the first to flee were the
wealthy, cultivated people, who knew perfectly well that Vienna
and Berlin were left intact, and that there, during Napoleon’s
occupation, the inhabitants led a gay life with the fascinating
Frenchmen, who at that time were so beloved by Russian men and
particularly Russian women.
They went, because for Russians there could be no question
whether it would be good or bad to have the French in control of
Moscow. It was impossible to exist under the dominion of the
French: That was worse than aught else. They began to escape even
before the battle of Borodino, and after the battle of Borodino
with greater and greater rapidity, not heeding the summons to
remain and protect the city, notwithstanding the statements of the
governor general of Moscow as to his intention of taking the
Iverskaya virgin and going forth to fight, and notwithstanding the
balloons which were destined to bring destruction upon the French,
and notwithstanding all the nonsense which Count Rostopchin wrote
about in his proclamations.
They knew that the army ought to fight, and that if it could
not, then it was no use for them to go out with their fine ladies
and their household serfs to Tri Gorui to do battle with Napoleon,
but that it was necessary for them to make their escape, however
much they might regret leaving their property to destruction.
They fled, and gave never a thought to the majestic
significance of this splendid and rich capital abandoned by its
inhabitants, and unquestionably doomed to be burned (for it is not
in the nature of the Russian populace not to sack, not to set fire
to empty houses); they fled each for himself; but, at the same
time, merely as a consequence of their fleeing, was accomplished
that majestic event which will forever remain the crowning glory
of the Russian people.
* * *
VOLUME IV
PART 4, CHAPTER IV
After the encounter at Viazma, where Kutuzof could not restrain
his troops from the desire to overthrow, to cut off the enemy, the
further movement of the fleeing French and the pursuing Russians
took place without a battle until they reached Krasnoye.
The flight of the French was so rapid that the Russian army
chasing them could not catch up with them, that the horses in the
cavalry and artillery came to a standstill, and that information
in regard to the movements of the French was always untrustworthy.
The men of the Russian army were so worn out by these
uninterrupted marches of forty versts a day, that they could not
move onward any faster.
To appreciate the degree of exhaustion which the Russian army
suffered, it is only necessary to realize the significance of this
fact, that, while the Russian army, on leaving Tarutino, had a
hundred thousand men, and lost during the whole march not more
than five thousand in killed and wounded, and less than a hundred
taken prisoners, they had only fifty thousand men when they got to
Krasnoye.
The swift pursuit of the Russians after the French was as
destructive in its effect on them as the retreat was to the
French. The difference was only that the Russian army moved at
will, without that threat of destruction which hung over the
French army, an that, while the stragglers and the sick from among
the French would fall into the hands of the enemy, the Russians
who were left behind were at home.
The principal cause of the diminution of Napoleon’s army was
the rapidity of its flight, and indubitable proof of this is
furnished by the corresponding diminution of the Russian troops.
All Kutuzof’s efforts, just as had been the case at Tarutino
and at Viazma, were directed--so far as lay in his power--solely
to the preventing of interference with that destructive movement
of the French (though this was contrary to desires expressed in
Petersburg and in the Russian army by his own generals), but to
co-operate with it, and to render the movement of his own troops
as easy as possible.
But, moreover, ever since the troops had begun to suffer from
fatigue, and from the tremendous losses due to the rapidity of the
movement, Kutuzof had discovered still another reason for
slackening the exertions of the army, and for delay. The object of
the Russian troops was pursuit of the French. The route of the
French was unknown, and therefore the more closely our troops
followed on their heels, the more separated they became. Only by
following at some distance was it possible (by the most direct
road) to avoid the zigzags made by the French.
