| CHAP. VII.
Of the Sovereign.
It is plain from the above formula, that the act of association
includes a reciprocal engagement between particulars and the
public; and that each individual, in contracting, if I may so say
with himself, is laid under a twofold engagement, viz. as a
member of the sovereignty toward particular persons, and as a
member of the state toward the sovereign. That maxim of the civil
law, however, is inapplicable here, which says, that no one is
bound by the engagements he enters into with himself; for there is
a wide difference between entering into a personal obligation with
one's self, and with a whole, of which one may constitute a part.
It is further to be observed, that the public determination,
which is obligatory on the subject with regard to the sovereign,
on account of the twofold relation by which each stands
contracted, is not, for the contrary reason, obligatory on the
supreme power toward itself; and that it is consequently
inconsistent with the nature of the body-politic, that such
supreme power should impose a law, which it cannot break. For, as
the sovereign stands only in a single relation, it is in the same
case as that of an individual contracting with himself; whence it
is plain, that there neither is, nor can be, any fundamental law
obligatory on the whole body of a people, even the Social Compact
itself not being such. By this, however, it is not meant, that
such a body cannot enter into engagements with others, in matters
that do not derogate from this contract; for, with respect to
foreign objects, it is a simple and individual person.
But as the body-politic, or the sovereign, derives its very
existence from this inviolable contract, it can enter into no
lawful engagement, even with any similar body, derogatory from the
tenor of this primitive act; such as that of alienating any part
of itself, or of submitting itself entirely to a foreign
sovereign. To violate the act whereby it exists, would be to
annihilate itself; and from nothing can arise nothing.
No sooner are a multitude of individuals thus united in a body,
then it becomes impossible to act offensively against any of the
members without attacking the whole, and still less to offend the
whole body, without injuring the members. Hence both duty and
interest equally oblige the two contracting parties to assist each
other; and the same persons ought to endeavour to include, within
this twofold relation, all the advantages which depend on it.
Now the sovereign, being formed only by the several individuals
of which the state is composed, can have no interest contrary to
theirs: of course the supreme power stands in no need of any
guarantee toward the subjects, because it is impossible that the
body should be capable of hurting all its members; and we shall
see hereafter, that it can as little tend to injure any of them in
particular. Hence the sovereign is necessarily, and for the same
reason that it exists, always such as it ought to be.
The case is different, however, as to the relation in which the
subjects stand to the sovereign; as, notwithstanding their common
interest, the latter can have no security that the former will
discharge their engagements, unless means to be found to engage
their fidelity.
In fact, every individual may, as a man, entertain a particular
will, either contradictory or dissimilar to his general will as a
citizen. His private interest may influence him in a manner
diametrically opposite to the common interest of the society.
Reflecting on his own existence as positive and naturally
independent, he may conceive what he owes to the common cause to
be a free and gratuitous contribution, the want of which will be
less hurtful to others than the discharge of it will be burdensome
to himself; and, regarding the moral person of the state as an
imaginary being, because it is not a man, he may be delirious of
enjoying all the privileges of a citizen, without fulfilling his
engagement as a subject; an injustice, that, in its progress, must
necessarily be the ruin of the body-politic.
To the end, therefore, that the social compact should not prove
an empty form, it tacitly includes this engagement, which only can
enforce the rest, viz. that whosoever refuses to pay
obedience to the general will, shall be liable to be compelled to
it by the force of the whole body. And this is in effect nothing
more than that they may be compelled to be free; for such is the
condition which, in uniting every citizen to the state, secured
him from all personal dependence; a condition, which forms the
whole artifice and play of the political machine: it is this alone
that renders all social engagements just and equitable, which,
without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and subject to the most
enormous abuses.
CHAP. VIII.
Of civil society in general.
The transition of man from a state of nature to a state of
society is productive of a very remarkable change in his being, by
substituting justice instead of instinct as the rule of his
conduct, and attaching that morality to his actions of which they
were before destitute. It is in immediate consequence of this
change, when the voice of duty succeeds to physical impulse and
the law of appetite, that man, who hitherto regarded only his own
gratification, finds himself obliged to act on other principles,
and to consult his reason before he follows the dictates of his
passions. Although, by entering into a state of society, he is
deprived also of many advantages which depend on that of nature,
he gains by it others so very considerable: his faculties exert
and expand themselves; his ideas are enlarged; his sentiments
ennobled; and his whole soul is elevated to so great a degree,
that, if the abuses of this new state do not degrade him below the
former, he ought incessantly to bless that happy moment in which
he was rescued from it, and converted from a stupid and ignorant
animal, into an intelligent and wise being.
To state the balance of what is lost and gained by this change,
we shall reduce it to comparative terms. By entering into the
social compact, man gives up his natural liberty or unlimited
right to every thing which he is desirous of and can attain. In
return for this, he gains social liberty, and an exclusive
property in all those things of which he is possessed. To avoid
any mistake, however, in the nature of these compensations, it is
necessary to make a just distinction between natural liberty,
which is limited by nothing but the inabilities of the individual,
and social liberty, which is limited by the general will of the
community; and also, between that possession which is only
effected by force, or follows the right of prior occupancy, and
that property which is only founded on a positive title.
To the preceding also may be added, as the acquisition of a
social state, moral liberty, which only renders a man truly master
of himself: for to be under the direction of appetite alone is to
be in a state of slavery; while to pay obedience only to those
laws which we prescribe for ourselves, is liberty. But I have said
too much already on this subject, the philosophical meaning of the
word Liberty being in this place out of the question.
CHAP. VIII.
Of political religion.
...
But, laying aside political considerations, let us return to
the matter of right, and ascertain its true principles with regard
to this important point. The right which the social compact
confers on the sovereign, extending no farther than to public
utility, the subject is not accountable to that sovereign on
account of any opinions he may entertain that have nothing to do
with the community. Now it is of great importance to a state, that
every citizen should be of a religion that may inspire him with a
regard for his duty: but the tenets of that religion are no
farther interesting to the community than as they relate to
morals, and to the discharge of those obligations which the
professor lies under to his fellow-citizens. If we except these,
the individual may profess what others he pleases, without the
sovereign's having any right to interfere; for having no
jurisdiction in the other world, it is nothing to the sovereign
what becomes of the citizens in a future life, provided they
discharge the duties incumbent on them in the present.
There is a profession of faith, therefore, purely political;
the articles of which it is in the province of the sovereign to
ascertain, not precisely as articles of religion, but as the
sentiments due to society, without which it is impossible to be a
good citizen or faithful subject. Without compelling any one to
adopt these sentiments, the sovereign may also equitably banish
him the society; not indeed as impious, but as unsociable, as
incapable of having a sincere regard to justice, and of
sacrificing his life, if required, to his duty. Again, should any
one, after having made a public profession of such sentiments,
betray his disbelief of them by his misconduct, he may be
equitably be punished with death; having committed the greatest of
all crimes, that of belying his heart in the face of the laws.
The tenets of political religion should be few and simple; they
should be laid down also with precision, and without explication
or comment. The existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent,
prescient, and provident Deity; a future state; the reward of the
virtuous, and the punishment of the wicked; the sacred nature of
the social contract, and of the laws; these should be its positive
tenets. As to those of a negative kind, I would confine myself
solely to one, by forbidding persecution.
Those who affect to make a distinction between civil and
religious toleration, are, in my opinion, mistaken. It is
impossible to live cordially in peace with those whom we firmly
believe devoted to damnation; to love them would be to hate the
Deity for punishing them; it is therefore absolutely necessary for
us either to persecute or to convert them. Wherever the spirit of
religious persecution subsists, it is impossible it should not
have some effect on the civil police; in which case, the sovereign
is no longer sovereign even in a secular view; the priests become
the real masters, and kings only their officers.
In modern governments, where it is impossible to support an
exclusive national religion, it is requisite to tolerate all such
as breathe the spirit of toleration toward others, provided their
tenets are not contradictory to the duty of a good citizen. But
whosoever should presume to say, There is no salvation out of
the pale of our church, ought to be banished from the state,
unless indeed the state be an ecclesiastical one, and the prince a
pontiff. Such a dogma is of use only in a theocratical government;
in every other it is destructive. The reason which it is said
Henry IV gave for embracing the Roman Catholic religion ought to
have made an honest man reject it, and more particularly a prince
capable of reasoning on the subject.
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