Excerpts
from Hobbes' Leviathan,
Part One
From a Web site by
Bjorn Christensson
LEVIATHAN
by
Thomas Hobbes
* * * * *
THE FIRST PART: OF MAN
* * * * *
CHAPTER XIII: OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND
AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY AND MISERY
NATURE hath made men so equal in the faculties of
body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes
manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when
all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so
considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit
to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength
of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either
by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the
same danger with himself.
And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded
upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and
infallible rules, called science, which very few have and but in few
things, as being not a native faculty born with us, nor attained, as
prudence, while we look after somewhat else, I find yet a greater
equality amongst men than that of strength. For prudence is but
experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things
they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such
equality incredible is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which
almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar;
that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame,
or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature
of men that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more
witty, or more eloquent or more learned, yet they will hardly believe
there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at
hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men
are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a
greater sign of the equal distribution of anything than that every man
is contented with his share.
From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining
of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which
nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the
way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and
sometimes their delectation only) endeavour to destroy or subdue one
another. And from hence it comes to pass that where an invader hath no
more to fear than another man's single power, if one plant, sow, build,
or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come
prepared with forces united to dispossess and deprive him, not only of
the fruit of his labour, but also of his life or liberty. And the
invader again is in the like danger of another.
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to
secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or
wiles, to master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no
other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his
own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also, because
there be some that, taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in
the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security
requires, if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within
modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would
not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist.
And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men being
necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Again, men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief)
in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all.
For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same
rate he sets upon himself, and upon all signs of contempt or
undervaluing naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst
them that have no common power to keep them in quiet is far enough to
make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his
contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of
quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.
The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the
third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves
masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the
second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a
different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in
their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their
nation, their profession, or their name.
Hereby it is manifest that during the time men
live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that
condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man
against every man. For
war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a
tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently
known: and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the
nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of
foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an
inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war
consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other
time is peace.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of
war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same consequent to the
time wherein men live without other security than what their own
strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such
condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is
uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor
use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious
building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require
much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time;
no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual
fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things
that Nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and
destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this
inference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same
confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with himself: when
taking a journey, he arms himself and seeks to go well accompanied;
when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he
locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws and public
officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what
opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his
fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and
servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse
mankind by his actions as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse
man's nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are in
themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those
passions till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be
made they cannot know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed
upon the person that shall make it.
It may peradventure be thought there was never such a time nor
condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over
all the world: but there are many places where they live so now. For
the savage people in many places of America, except the government of
small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no
government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I
said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there
would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of
life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government use
to degenerate into a civil war.
But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in
a condition of war one against another, yet in all times kings and
persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in
continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators,
having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another;
that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their
kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture
of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects,
there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty
of particular men.
To this war of every man against every man, this
also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right
and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is
no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and
fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are
none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they
might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses
and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in
solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition that there be no
propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be
every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it. And
thus much for the ill condition which man by mere nature is actually
placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting
partly in the passions, partly in his reason.
The passions that incline men to peace are: fear of death; desire of
such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their
industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of
peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they
which otherwise are called the laws of nature, whereof I shall speak
more particularly in the two following chapters.
|